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EAST ASIA

KOREA

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KWANGBOK PROJECT STEPPED UP FOR OLYMPIC GAMES, YOUTH FESTIVAL

Youth Shock Brigade Mobilized

Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 13 May 87 p 1

[Text] As the triumphal songs continuously rise up at the Kwangbok Street construction site, the fighters of the 2d brigade, Speed Battle Youth Shock Brigade and the Tong Ku Public Building Regiment of the Pyongyang City Youth Division, who are in charge of construction of the youth hotel, have brought about the proud result of having completely finished the frame assembly up to the 34th floor.

In the area of the Ch'ilgol overpass, the magnificent structure of the youth hotel soars up to the sky, thereby giving a fresh appearance to this area and vigorously demonstrating again the spirit of the speed battle being powerfully carried out in Kwangbok Street construction.

Comrade Kim Chong-il, secretary and member of the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee, has said:

"The fundamental demand of the speed battle is to mobilize all efforts fully, maintaining the highest quality while pressing forward with the work at the greatest possible speed."

Holding high the plan of the party to vigorously conduct a speed battle and shock battle in Kwangbok Street construction, the functionaries of the political section and construction command section of the Pyongyang City Youth Construction Division have frequently visited the units responsible for this construction and planned, coordinated, and carried out political work and guidance work concerning construction organization.

The fighters of the 2d Brigade of the Speed Battle Youth Shock Brigade and the Tong Ku Public Building Construction Regiment, who are responsible for hotel construction under the guidance of the division command, have aided and helped each other along, and in scarcely 5 months have successfully pushed forward a vast construction project.

Functionaries of the Tong Ku Public Building Construction Regiment put efforts into guidance in order to ensure the successful start of construction and are

raising the flames of a movement to innovate using techniques of the masses, thoroughly solving technical problems as necessary.

In this fashion, they made it completely possible to ensure vast amounts of concrete composite materials at low labor and material costs. Newly creating a cave-type general mixing area, they have successfully adopted the partitioning method using local materials, and greatly enabled increases in construction speed and quality. And they vigorously pressed forward with the work even while conserving some 7,000 man-days and many construction materials, including 100,000 bricks.

Meanwhile, the functionaries of the 2d Brigade of the Ahead of Schedule Speed Battle Shock Brigade, like the commanders of the Anti-Japanese guerillas, penetrated the battle field, where they vigorously called the young construction workers to carry out the party's plan for accelerating Kwangbok Street construction, and led them forward by their personal example.

In this fashion, fighters of the 1st Battalion, which is in charge of concrete form assembly, adopted comprehensive assembly methods for concrete forms, reducing to 1 hour the task that had required 8 hours. The 2d Battalion firmly accomplished the next process, even while raising the quality of reinforced concrete assembly to the highest standards.

Moreover, the 5th Battalion set areas of responsibility by company and platoon, increasing the speed of placing concrete by 2.5 times. The 4th Battalion fighters mobilized an additional 20 large truckloads per day, thoroughly ensuring the supply of aggregate ahead of schedule for construction.

In particular, technical functionaries of the brigade successfully developed combined water buckets that matched the hoisting power of the cranes enabling a 1.5 times increase in construction speed, while also increasing the quality of construction items.

KPA Rallies

Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 13 May 87 p 1

[Text] A fire storm is blazing in the speed battle at the Kwangbok Street construction site, which is rising up on a huge scale as another memorial created to commemorate the era of the Worker's Party.

Holding high the policy speech of the great leader, the Kwangbok Street construction workers, who launched vigorously into the worthwhile fulfilling of the Third 7-Year Plan, are day after day continuing to create new feats at each battleground with spirits that seek to advance the schedule and complete construction for the World Festival of Youth and Students.

The Korean People's Army unit of Comrade Yun Yong-Kyong held an inspirational rally at the [construction] site in order to bring about new innovations in Kwangbok Street construction, thoroughly achieving the party's decision and directives.

Functionaries from related fields attended the rally together with the soldiers.

At the rally, Han Yong-ku, Ku Cha-hwang, Yang Hak-ch'ol, and Kim Song-ch'an made speeches following the report of Yun Yong-kyong.

Those giving reports and speeches stressed the fact that Kwangbok Street construction was a major project for the creation of a more magnificent and splendid P'yongyang--capital of the revolution--and to ensure the 13th World Youth and Student Festival and North-South cohosting of the Olympics.

They spoke concerning the fact that our party unveiled a grand plan for construction of the brilliantly named Kwangbok Street in the deeply historic Man'gyongdae District, and is actively and energetically leading the way to press on with bold and daring construction operations.

They pointed out that the beloved comrade, Kim Chong-il, on various occasions has recently looked in on the Kwangbok Street construction project, and has set the priority task in order further to accelerate construction; and that he has shown KPA soldiers great, great confidence by entrusting them with construction of one of the major tasks the building of apartment housing.

Those who made reports and gave speeches pointed out the need to hold high the struggle slogan of the party, "Let us vigorously accelerate the grand march of the 1980's, in the style of constructing the Sohae lockgates," and, in the attitude and heroic spirit of the Sohae lockgate builders, boldly and on a grand scale begin a shock battle and surpass the plan every day, every 10 days, and every month.

The speakers stressed the need to complete 12,500 square meters of modern housing by mid-April 1988, faithfully following the leadership of the party and exhibiting the heroism of the masses, while affirming that there can be no citadel that cannot be seized as long as there is the clear-sighted leadership of the dear Comrade Kim Chong-il, who has matchless courage and who leads the way to the victory of socialist construction.

The speakers also pointed out that all functionaries must, like the commanders of the anti-Japanese guerillas, become the standard bearers of struggle. Like trumpets sounding the charge, they should lead the masses by force of personal example, and they must actively call the military construction workers to new achievements by providing energetic support with vigorous political work and economic agitation.

The speakers emphasized the need to break through all difficulties through one's own efforts, with the indomitable spirit of struggle required to cross flaming rivers and hike muddy roads; and with an attitude of self-improvement to produce things that are not available and to seek out materials in short supply in order vigorously to accelerate construction.

Those who gave reports and speeches noted the need actively to adopt new construction methods and rationalization proposals and to take measures to ensure

labor organization and materials, vigorously waging a campaign to learn from the Three Revolutionary Red Flags Struggle Campaign, the campaign to emulate the unsung heroes, and the campaign for technical improvements by the masses in order to complete vast and seemingly unmanageable construction tasks splendidly within a short period of time.

The speakers also spoke of the need constantly to continue to revolutionize themselves through actual struggle to accelerate construction, by working at all times in a tense and mobilized posture and by prominently displaying the beautiful communist spirit of helping and leading one another in life.

Those giving reports and speeches emphasized the need faithfully to repay the party's great, great confidence and expectations by fully exercising the power of 1 is a match for 100, by finishing the assigned construction ahead of schedule.

The meeting adopted a resolution.

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PROFILE OF KIM POK-TONG, MAN BEHIND 29 JUNE AFFAIR

41070253 Seoul SINDONG-A in Korean Sep 87 pp 250-263

[Article by Kang Song-chae, editorial staff member of the TONG-A ILBO, based partly on his interview of Kim Pok-tong in Seoul on 11 August 1987]

[Text] Urged Chairman No To Make the Epochal Decision

The time was early July: each day, people were pouring over their copies of daily newspapers from corner to corner as they found the contents as interesting as any absorbing novel.

It was in that period that THE NEW YORK TIMES, in its 7 July issue, carried a sonorous, thoughtful commentary worthy of the reader's attention; the commentary, even quoted by our domestic press, dealt with behind-the-scenes activities of our country's political and military sectors leading up to No T'ae-u's special declaration of 29 June.

What particularly caught the attention of our intellectual circles was the commentary's identification as the man behind the 29 June declaration of Mr Kim Pok-tong (age 54), a lieutenant general on the Army reserve, who has generally kept himself out of the mass media with one exception which occurred in May 1982 when he was named the president of the Korea Mining Promotion Corporation. The commentary read in part:

"The assumption is that DJP Chairman (then) No T'ae-u must have discreetly taken soundings of the military's reaction. Many politicians said that it was their understanding that Chairman No, in the course of making that effort, had received help from Mr Kim Pok-tong, who is his brother-in-law and fellow retired general officer as well.

"With regard to the nature of the help, these same politicians pointed out that it was not only to ensure the military's support but also to find out whether or not any active opposition was likely from the military."

The commentary simply touched on Mr Kim's role in probing the military's intentions, making no references to either his own view of the political situation or what specific influence he had had on Chairman No's decision.

It is known, however, that Mr Kim, prior to the 29 June event, had met many times with Chairman No, who is his younger sister's husband, to stress upon No the urgency of the political situation.

Of course there were many senior individuals of the government and the ruling party whose hidden efforts contributed toward the issuance of the 29 June declaration. Prime Minister Yi Han-ki and former Prime Minister Sin Hyon-Hwak, who is Chairman No's senior alumnus from Kyongbuk High School, reportedly shared the belief that the way to resolve the situation was to adopt the system of direct presidential election and to pardon Mr Kim Tae-chung with his civic rights restored; they are said to have conveyed this view to Chairman No by a memorandum. Also not to be discounted are the open and hidden support rendered by Defense Minister Chong Ho-yong and DJP member of the National Assembly Yu Hak-song; it was Minister Chong who, before the 29 June declaration came out, had remarked, "Although he is being circumspect, Chairman No is a man capable of doing something big one of these days." Last but not least, one cannot leave out the pressure exerted by the United States in opposing the use of troops in order to control the situation and pressing for the democratization of South Korea. Quite possibly some might be more inclined to attach more importance to the role played by the United States.

Be that as it may, it seems out of the question to downgrade in any way the significance of the points stressed by Mr Kim when he called on Chairman No on 19 June, when troop mobilization was being viewed as a strong possibility.

Early that morning, according to an inside source, Mr Kim made an unannounced visit to Chairman No's residence at Yonhui-dong and told No generally as follows:

"Given the way more than 100,000 students and townspeople demonstrated late into last night in Pusan, it is ominous that demonstrations will turn more severe and the political situation more difficult. At this juncture, even if you withdraw the '13 April measure' and promise constitutional reform within next year, the people will simply laugh you to scorn. For, as you know, the government has already changed its mind many times on the question of whether the Constitution should or should not be amended. I therefore believe that the only way you can possibly bring public sentiment under control is to come up with some epoch-making move that will shock the people. One such move, which will take the people and the opposition by surprise, is to accept the system of direct presidential election and to pardon Mr Kim Tae-chung with full restoration of rights.

"Especially if Yi Han-yol, the young man who got hit by a tear-gas canister and has been hospitalized at the Yonse University Hospital since, should die, do you expect the aroused students to remain calm? Who can guarantee that they will not come storming over here (Chairman No's residence), which is so close to Yonse University? As a matter of fact, there is information indicating that some students are indeed planning such an attack.

"In this extraordinary situation, should troops be mobilized to quell student demonstrations, suppression might be possible for a short term but how do you plan to cope with the consequences of such a move? Many thinking people are concerned that the consequences might very well prove to be fatal to this nation. This is why I say that you must make a bold move--the kind which I outlined earlier. If needed, I can run errand for you; I can even obtain a signed statement from retired general officers, urging you to make such a resolute decision. I hope that you will give this matter careful considerations and come to an epoch-making decision as soon as possible."

Once Served as Chief Secretary to General Kim Chae-Kyu

The spirited discussion between the two men lasted so long that Chairman No was later than usual to leave for his office that morning, according to a source close to No.

It is said that the emergency plan for mobilization of the troops was officially called off about 4 pm that day. The decision reportedly was made at a party-government joint meeting held somewhere in Seoul, attended by Chairman No, Prime Minister Yi Han-ki, DJP Secretary General Yi Chun-ku, Defense Minister Yi Ki-paek and other cabinet ministers responsible for security matters. At that meeting, Chairman No and Prime Minister Yi reportedly argued for moderation, opposing the use of troops.

Subsequent to the "fateful" 19 June encounter, Mr Kim reportedly met with Chairman No a couple more times and urged him to make up his mind. It is also reported that he had met and had important talks with U.S. Ambassador Lilley prior to the "29 June" event. Rumor also has it that about 11 am on 9 July, the day when the funeral service was being held for Yi Han-yol, Mr Kim met with Cardinal Kim Su-hwan at the Hotel Royal in Myong-dong and exchanged views regarding the political situation.

In mid-July, in an effort to find out about details of the inside story behind the 29 June declaration, I requested an interview with Mr Kim Pok-tong, whom I have known since 9 years ago, only to be told, through his secretarial staff, that "he did not wish to see you at this time."

I had had two "off the record" discussions with him previously--once in the fall of 1984 and again in the summer of 1985. Emboldened by this past record, on 1 August I made another request for an interview, which resulted in a meeting on 11 August at a Japanese-style restaurant in the Map'o District of Seoul.

When we met, Mr Kim was still reluctant to grant an interview. I held firm by telling him, "In that case, I have no choice but to write up something on the basis of what I already know plus whatever else I can collect from those around you." He then compromised, saying "Instead of making this a formal interview, let us just talk about the old days while having lunch together."

I started off with a question on something which I had long been curious about:

[Question] "When Mr Kim Chae-kyu, the central figure in the '26 October' incident [1979 assassination of President Pak Chong-hui], was in charge of the Army Security Command, I understand you served as his chief secretary. When was it that you first met him?"

[Answer] "It was a sheer coincidence that led to my first meeting with Mr Kim Chae-kyu. I am afraid it is going to be a long story, but here it is. It all happened in the summer of 1966, when I was serving as chairman of the North Star Alumni Association, an organization of the graduates of the 4-year Military Academy.

"In late July that year, General Ch'ae Myong-sin, who was then the commanding general of the South Korean Forces operating in Vietnam, came home and made a courtesy call on President Pak Chong-hui at the Blue House. On that occasion, General Ch'ae allegedly told the president, 'I had taken with me to Vietnam some of the officers who are graduates of the 4-year Military Academy, believing that they were strongly patriotic and the embodiment of the military spirit; but, once we got out there, I found them to be not only inept in operational leadership but also quite cowardly.' General Ch'ae reportedly followed it up with a recommendation that the cadet training program of the Military Academy be reviewed.

"Perhaps it might have been just a rumor, not a factual account, but when I heard about it, it struck me as an unjust assessment to say things that sounded almost like blaming the academy graduates for all operational failures out there, even though it was quite possible that there were some inept ones among the so many academy-graduate officers who were sent to Vietnam mainly for combat experience.

"As chairman of the academy's alumni association, I racked my brains to figure out some way to restore our honor. Finally, I decided to hold a pictorial exhibit on the occasion of a joint athletic meet of the three service academies--an exhibit that will show the proof of combat braveryes of the academy graduates who took part in the Vietnam War.

"Then I began collecting suitable pictures, some through the good offices of the then Ministry of Public Information and some more by mail from my academy classmates and juniors serving in Vietnam at the time. The collected pictures were enlarged to exhibit sizes. To put up these pictures for the exhibit, I needed plywood. I happened to know there was a large supply of plywood at the 6th Military District Headquarters; at that time, Maj Gen Kim Chae-Kyu was in command there, and his aide-de-camp was Captain Pak Hung-chu, who was later executed for his involvement in the '26 October' affair."

Pictorial Exhibit Brought the Two Men Together

Mr Kim went on to say that he, then a major, then telephoned Captain Pak, whom he had never met, and asked for an appointment with the commanding general. His account of the telephone conversation with Captain Pak is reconstructed verbatim below as I believe it is a good demonstration of the workings of the code of seniority among the academy graduates and also of the military cast of mind that has become the second nature of these men:

[Kim] "This is Major Kim Pok-tong calling. Listen, you are an academy graduate, are you not?"

[Pak] "Sir, I am, Sir!"

[Kim] "What class are you?"

[Pak] "An 18th-class graduate, Sir!"

[Kim] "I must see your commanding general about a pictorial exhibit on the Vietnam war. When can I do it?"

[Pak] "Sir, if you could come sometime tomorrow morning, I will see to it, Sir!"

[Kim] "Good. I will be there at 10 tomorrow morning."

When Major Kim entered the office of the commanding general of the 6th Military District at Yongdungp'o at the appointed hour the next morning, Maj Gen Kim Chae-Kyu was having a conversation with a classmate (the 2nd class) of his from the Military Academy days, Maj Gen Hyon Sok-chu (then chief of G-4, ROK Army Headquarters). That was, said Mr Kim, the first time he came face to face with Kim Chae-Kyu.

"Major Kim Pok-tong here, Sir, to see the commanding general of the 6th Military District"--with his self-introduction, he proceeded to explain his reason for coming, saying that he needed plywood for the pictorial exhibit and that the plywood would be returned as soon as the exhibit was over. Upon listening, General Kim willingly agreed to help.

It was then that General Hyon, who has been closely looking at Major Kim's name patch showing his name written in Korean script, spoke to Kim with laughter about his name; Major Kim responded in an appropriate manner:

General Hyon: "Ha-ha, so Kim Pok-tong is your name; the character 'pok' stands for 'happiness' and the character 'tong' means 'child'--it is a child's name, huh? How come you are displaying a child's name?"

Major Kim: "Sir, you read my name that way because it is written in Korean script, but actually in my case 'tong' stands for the character meaning

'east' and 'pok is the character meaning 'to repeat.' The character 'tong' is a generation indicator among the Andong line of the Kim clan. So, when it is written in Chinese characters, it is a fine name. Although you just made fun of my name, chances are you will remember my name for a long time to come. For that reason, too, my name is a good one."

When Major Kim finished his unflustered, orderly response, the two generals looked at each other and shared a hearty laugh.

Perhaps it was because Major Kim's demeanor on that occasion favorably impressed General Kim Chae-kyu--at any rate, the general not only helped the major with plywood but also came to remember him long after that. That was how Major Kim was able to hold the pictorial exhibit for 3 days beginning 26 September at the Hyoch'ang soccer field while a joint athletic meet of the three service academies was being held there.

That chance encounter was the beginning of a lasting relationship between the two men; later, in August 1967, when he was given the task of creating a new ranger battalion, General Kim remembered the major well enough to pick him as the commanding officer of the new ranger battalion to be formed. At that time Kim Pok-tong, who had already been promoted to lieutenant colonel in November 1966, was serving as a front-line battalion commander with the 5th Division. By then, he was already one of the few who were on the fast track, pulling away from the majority of his academy classmates numbering some 150.

Commissioned as a second lieutenant in September 1955 upon graduating from the Military Academy--he was the eighth best student of that class, Kim Pok-tong and some of his classmates went to the Infantry School in Kwongju and received the basic curriculum; he then served as a platoon leader in the forward area for 1 year beginning spring of 1956; he was promoted to the rank of first lieutenant on 1 September 1957.

Love Marriage While in Kwangju

He fell in love with and married a girl--his present wife Im Kum-chu (age 52 now)--in the fall of 1958, when he was serving as a unit commander at the Kwangju Infantry School. At the time, Ms Im had graduated from a college and was teaching at Hwasun Junior High School.

He was promoted to captain in September 1960 and to major in September 1962. It turned out that only some 20 of his academy peers were promoted to major at that time ahead of the rest. Discontent arose within the group over what they perceived as ambiguity in the promotion criteria. An emergency general meeting of the academy's 11th graduating class was called, resulting in a decision to send a few representatives to see the Army's chief of staff and director of personnel with a recommendation that "appropriate steps be taken to have all members of the 11th graduating class promoted at the same time, even if this meant promotion delay of 1 year for

everyone." Kim Pok-tong was chosen as one of the representatives. No Tae-u, then a captain, was chairman of the 11th class alumni association.

Accordingly, Major Kim and other representatives of the group made daily visits to the residence of General So Chong-chol, personnel director of the Army, located at Chongpa-dong, on 3 consecutive days; each day they waited at the gate until almost the curfew time but all for naught--they failed to see General So.

[Question] "When were you officially appointed as chief secretary to General Kim Chae-kyu, the commanding officer of the Army Security Command?"

[Answer] "It was around May 1968; at that time, the ranger battalion, which I created, was being acknowledged as a strong force as good as any comparable unit anywhere. Perhaps it was in recognition of the motivation and passion with which I had been nurturing the ranger battalion which was assigned to the 6th Military District; anyway, not only was I appointed as chief of General Kim's secretariat but a while later I was also given a concurrent appointment as chief of the planning and organization staff with the authority over personnel and financial matters as well. When I was made chief of the commanding general's secretariat, the organization was still known as the Counterintelligence Corps; the name was changed to Army Security Command as of 1 October 1968."

[Question] "At the age of 35, you practically became the man of real power at the Security Command; I suppose there were quite a few episodes while you were there."

[Answer] "In those days, the Security Command was indeed the most powerful organization. Because of that, we were bombarded with countless requests for special favors from the commanding general's hometown folks, his relatives and in-laws, and others; how to deal with such requests was a troublesome question for more reasons than one. Finally, we designated the grandfather (General Kim's father) as the sole window through which all civilian petitions had to be channeled. After that, I visited him once a month, partly to deliver some money for his living and partly to listen to, and take care of if possible, the requests he had collected to that point. Requests such as 'please arrange transfer of so-and-so from this unit to that unit' posed not much of a problem--they could be arranged, somehow. But most of the requests were impossible to meet without violating laws and regulations. In those cases, I would carefully explain why I was helpless to do anything about them; the grandfather usually understood.

"Just when the problems were beginning to ease up quite a bit as a result of the centralized window system, one day I was told that a corporal, claiming to be a relative of General Kim's, was at the reception room demanding to see the general. He was advised to go to the general's residence to see him, but he would not budge. So I ordered to have the man brought to my office. A while later he came: the minute he opened my door I slapped his cheek and kicked the devil out of him, admonishing him

loudly that his kind of behavior was an act of disrespect and disservice to the elder. Then I chased him out.

"After that incident, the discipline and order around our headquarters improved in many respects--perhaps word had got around that even a relative of the commanding general's was shown no mercy when he tried to be unreasonable.

"About a month later, however, General Kim called me in and quietly lectured me: 'It is not that I do not understand why you did it--you wanted to uphold discipline and order. Still, why did you have to use force instead of having a good talk with him to make him understand!?' said the general.

"Looking back, even in those days, General Kim was a gentle and reasonable man, although he had occasional outburst of temper."

First One To Earn a Star Among His Peers

[Question] "Is it true that General Kim Chae-kyu always showed his due respect to General Yi Chong-chan, who had refused to obey President Syngman Rhee's order to dispatch troops to quell the 1952 political riot in Pusan in order to prolong his regime?"

[Answer] "He did so, indeed. General Yi Chong-chan once did him a great favor. From that point on, General Kim unfailingly treated General Yi with respect and courtesy, not only as a senior person in the Army but also as his personal teacher.

"General Kim was so attentive toward General Yi that he would not let even small details slip by unattended. Once he bought a set of golf clubs for General Yi as a gift. Later, he received word that General Yi was not playing golf at all; he immediately instructed me to prepare a letter in his name pleading General Yi to please play golf, and sent me down to Chinhae, where General Yi was at that time, to deliver the letter personally.

"I still remember how anxious General Kim was to make sure that I worded the letter in such a way to make General Yi instantly feel like going out to the golf course upon reading it and how I had to resort to all the rhetorical flourishes under my command in preparing that letter."

Then, in response to my question "Wasn't there any resistance or adverse reaction of any kind to your possessing such enormous authority over the personnel and financial matters--the two most important areas for the control of any organization?", Mr Kim gave me a candid account of the frictions that had existed between him and others such as a certain Brigadier General Mun, who was then the chief of staff of the Security Command. He followed it with a rhetorical question: "How could there not have been adverse reactions when I treated people in such a naughty way?"

In the end, he said, he ended up being sent to Vietnam as the security chief of the South Korean military contingent operating there: it was March 1969; he was a full colonel by then.

Before receiving the official assignment order, he continued, he made a last-ditch appeal to General Kim with these words: "If I had failed to properly support you, then it is a different matter; but if not, would you please reconsider my assignment to Vietnam?" But General Kim, with a troubled expression, strongly urged him to "go as planned because people are saying all kinds of things about you." So the fate was sealed: he packed and went to Vietnam. In retrospect, he said, he had gained many valuable experiences in matters having to do with power, organization, and interpersonnel relations while serving at the Security Command.

Had To Establish His Noninvolvement in "26 October" Affair

Upon completion of his Vietnam tour of nearly 2 years as the security chief, Mr Kim Pok-tong came home in February 1971 and was reassigned to the 26th Division as a regimental commander. He earned his first star effective 1 January 1973.

Of the academy's 11th class graduates, the first ones to attain the rank of brigadier general were, in addition to Kim Pok-tong, Chon Tu-hwan, Son Yong-kil, and Choe Song-taek.

Subsequent to his promotion to a general officer, Mr Kim served in the following capacities: the cadet commander, Korean Military Academy (effective January 1973); G-3 staff officer, Headquarters of the Third Army (effective March 1975); and commanding general of the 5th Division (effective February 1977). In January 1979, he was appointed as assistant deputy chief of operations for the Blue House Guards Unit, replacing his brother-in-law General No Tae-u. By then he had already been promoted to a major general in January 1977.

Cha Chi-chol, director of the Blue House Guards Unit, made the most of high personal trust placed in him by the then President Pak. For instance, while holding that position, Cha put many alde general officers under his command; of this, people used to make such interpretive remarks as "It is Cha's complex that drove him to have many general officers work under him--the complex rooted in the fact that the highest rank he had achieved in his army career was captain."

In 1979, when the "26 October" incident broke, his past "special ties" with KCIA Director Kim Chae-kyu thrust Maj General Kim Pok-tong into the position of having to "clearly establish" his noninvolvement in the affair in front of the investigating authorities.

Sometime ago, on another occasion, I was with Mr Kim Pok-tong and the subject of "26 October" incident came up; at that time, I asked him this question:

"Supposing Director Kim Chae-kyu had confided in you in advance the action plan for the '26 October' plot, what do you think you would have done?" He appeared to ponder a while, then he gave me this answer: "This question, with nothing concrete to support it, is very difficult to answer; however, if it did happen, most probably I would have either joined him or reported him to the proper authorities--I do not believe I would have wavered in between."

Getting back to where I had left it off, I started to question him about his activities subsequent to the 26 October event; he merely said, "The time is not right yet for me to disclose such things, so please understand," after which he clammed up. So I switched the subject and asked him a few questions about matters related to the current political situation:

[Question] "Do you see a smooth road ahead for the democratization proclaimed by Chairman No?"

[Answer] "That is a good question. I am afraid there are too many variables. Anyway, looking ahead even based on the assumption that there are no discordant notes heard within the administration and the ruling party, if extreme labor-management disputes and violent student demonstrations should drive our society into chaotic conditions of the worst kind, democratization would not be able to make headway--not easily. That is what concerns me the most.

"Should the situation reach a point where social order can no longer be maintained by the use of normal police force, I think it will inevitably force the military to come into action.

"If the middle of such chaotic conditions a coup d'etat should occur, the consequences would indeed be grave. The coup leaders undoubtedly will remove all politicians of both sides--the ruling party as well as the opposition, and will attempt to establish a new political order; this, if happened, will touch off a fresh round of political vicious cycle.

"I will say, therefore, that all must exercise prudence in order to prevent this kind of chaos from becoming a reality."

Covert Contributions Should Be Changed to Overt Ones

At this point, in a very cautious tone, he expressed his private views regarding Mr Kim Tae-chung's upcoming visit to Kwangju:

"It has been said by the press that when Mr Kim Tae-chung visits Kwangju there will be waves of people, hundreds of thousands of them, welcoming him. I personally believe that it would be much better if he made the trip quietly rather than making it into such a hoopla.

"Even if Mr Kim Tae-chung went to Kwangju quietly and paid a visit to the Mangwol-dong graveyard, where the victims of the '18 May' uprising are buried, without a fanfare, the facts of his trip would surely be covered by the press. In that event, my feeling is that more people would credit him for having handled himself in a wise manner. I am saying this from the standpoint of a private citizen, not as the man in charge of a state-run corporation."

He impressed me as a man more astutely interested in political affairs than I had expected. So I tried another question on him:

[Question] "What are your views on the fundamental causes of the recent labor-management disputes and how they should be resolved?"

[Answer] "How can I possibly have the answer to such a complex and difficult issue? By way of an answer, let me quote from the remarks made to me yesterday by someone connected with the National Federation of Economic Organization.

"According to him, while in Japan corporations are returning 75 percent of their net earnings to the workers, in our country the ratio is a mere 49 percent. This ratio, he said, ought to be raised to 55 percent of thereabout and corporate managers must make an effort to make it so.

"Next, the main cause of the recent radicalization of labor-management dispute, he said, is the long-lasting suppression of the workers by those holding political power, but another factor no less important is the workers' perception of the corporate managers as a bunch of profiteers interested only in their own benefits and ambitions. It is this perception that has driven the workers to pursue their rights and interests through struggles rather than by moderate means; the result is the radicalization of the labor movement, he explained.

"For this reason, he continued, it is important to improve the image of corporate managers as part of the solution to the labor-management dispute. One way to facilitate this, he said with emphasis, is to stop the practice of levying a variety of off-the-record monetary contributions on the entrepreneurs and to start a practice of making such contributions on the record; this, he said, will foster a public realization that the entrepreneurs, too, are doing things in the interest of the nation and the society. For example, the government should publicly announce that corporation A contributed so much money toward national defense and the money was used to pay for so many tanks, or that company B's contribution was used to procure a warship--this is what he meant."

Expressed Opposition to the "12 December" Development

[Question] "What in your view are the intrinsic problems of our country and society?"

[Answer] "On one occasion some time ago, Professor Kim Chun-yop of Koryo University was debating with journalist Choe Sok-chae the question of what remedial steps should be prescribed for the prevalent malaise of our country. During the debate, Professor Kim cited five factors as the causes for the current chaos in our society: they included the problem related to our national ethos or spiritual fortitude that failed to clean out those elements who at one point or another had betrayed fellow countrymen and the nation; the question concerning the legitimacy of the regime in power; the problem of injustice and corruptions; and the problem of the gap between the rich and the poor. What he said struck a sympathetic cord in me.

"When these problems are set right or corrected one by one, I believe the chaos in our society will diminish gradually.

"If I may add one more thing: I hope that the me-oriented, egotistic propensity of our society be sublated by and by."

When I asked, "What is your view regarding political neutrality of the military?" he simply answered by saying, "I should think that the military ought to maintain political neutrality," without making any effort to elaborate on it. In addition to the extreme sensitivity of the question, he perhaps thought it was inappropriate for a man in charge of a state-run corporation to go beyond the basic principle in fielding such a question.

Mr Kim, who has consciously kept his action radius limited during these 5 years, ended our session with the following parting remarks, half to himself:

"I think I may be too much of an idealist. One may need to compromise with or, at times, even surrender to the reality, but I have been incapable of doing that. There have been times when I looked back and wondered whether I might not have vaguely pursued ideals when, in practical terms, I had no capacity to actualize such ideals of mine. Even so, I still believe that only when we have a society in which one may pursue achievable ideals can our country properly go forward as it should."

That Mr Kim indeed has an idealistic side has come through vividly, more than once, during the course of my investigation through people close to him of his post-"26 October" trail.

The "26 October" event took place when Mr Kim was serving as assistant deputy chief of operations for the Blue House Guards Unit. In early November, immediately after the state funeral for the slain President Pak, out of a strong sense of moral responsibility for the incident, Mr Kim reportedly submitted to the then Army chief of staff, General Chong Sung-hwa, a request for transfer to the reserve status. At a time when everyone's attention was wholly focused on the question of who will end up with the reins of government, he was the only one to submit a request for transfer to the reserve status; his request, it is said, was considered as extraordinary.

The request was turned down by Chief of Staff Chong, who decided instead to reassign him to the V Corps as deputy commander; Chong reportedly told him to take the non-pressure job and try to collect his thought. It was soon after he assumed the deputy corps commander's job that the "12 December" event occurred, which paved the way for the establishment of the Fifth Republic; it is no secret that Mr Kim expressed his opposition to that turn of events.

Had No Part in the National Security Committee

In December 1979, through the good offices of General Yu Hak-song, the then commanding general of the Third Army, Mr Kim was transferred to the Third Army as its chief of staff. At the first report of the uprising in Kwangju on 18 May 1980, Mr Kim reportedly advised General Yu that only police force should be used to restore order in Kwangju. This attitude of his, according to one source, even drew sarcastic remarks from some--remarks like "After all, his wife's family is in Kwangju; is it any wonder why he is saying such things?"

Soon thereafter, General Yu Hak-song was placed on the reserve and appointed as director of the KCIA (later renamed as the Security Planning Agency); about the same time, Mr Kim too was transferred to the Korean Military Academy as its superintendent. On 13 August, 1 month after becoming the academy superintendent, he was promoted to a lieutenant general.

According to later rumors, General Kim's personal preference was to become a corps commander, but he had to settle for the academy position, a job with no actual troops to command. It is also said that General Kim never had any part in the National Security Committee, and that he was a strong advocate of political neutrality on the part of the military.

This view of his on the military's role evolved into his desire to try to establish a new kind of relationship between the civilian and the military; it was this desire that, in the end, drove him to provide an active support to and actualizing the idea of holding a symposium on the theme of "The Military and National Development" under the academy's sponsorship--an idea proposed by General Yi Tong-hui, dean of the faculty at the academy (now 55 years old; retired from active duty and serving as president of Ch'ongju Teachers' College).

The symposium--a 2-day affair beginning 21 September 1981--was part of the academy's program commemorating the 33rd anniversary of the founding of the Army; 24 domestic and foreign scholars participated, making it a great success.

Sadness Marked His Retirement Ceremony

In his theme lecture delivered at the symposium, Professor Morris Janovitz (Chicago University), an authority in military sociology, stated as follows:

"In developing countries, there are many difficult problems to maintaining mutually harmonious relations between the civilian and the military. Some problems of this nature exist even in the United States. Before military service can become an integral part of civic education, much research covering many subject areas will have to be undertaken." On that premise, he went on to say, "For this reason, I believe that undertaking a comparative study of civilian-military relations in different countries will greatly facilitate the effort to resolve these problems."

Mr Ham Pyong-chun, who was then a professor at Yonse University (later became chief of the presidential secretariat; now deceased), gave a lecture on the theme of "The South Korean Armed Forces and National Development." In it, while not denying the contribution made by the military toward national development through the "16 May" action, he nevertheless made the following critical remarks:

"What is effective within the military may, by its nature, not be apropos for the civilian sector. For this reason, excessive intervention in the civilian affairs by the military could negate all the meritorious services rendered thusfar by the military.

"It is therefore important for the military to recognize the limits for its participation when considering its contribution to the future development of the nation. By the same token, it should be said that the key to a successful utilization of the military's varied experiences and wisdom toward acceleration of national development lies in the degree of cooperation by the military with the experts in other, nonmilitary sectors."

This thesis, with its subtle emphasis on the possible counterproductive impact on national development arising from across-the-board intervention by the military, seems also to have been intended as a barb directed at an attitude then prevalent in the society that tended to overly downgrade the role being played by an elite group of men with military background.

Mr Yi Tong-hui, a fellow graduate of Mr Kim's from the academy's 11th class, expressed his view saying, "The time has come for the civilian sector of our society to study the military and for the military to accept the live values of the civilian sector." He then defined the significance of the symposium with these words: "In that context, this symposium marks the first-ever academic examination of the civilian-military relationship in South Korea." (Quotes are from "Oh The Men of 'Hwarang' Tradition!" authored by Yi Tong-hui.) ["Hwarang" refers to the young elite of the ancient Silla Kingdom, who were chosen for their good looks and bravery and were given special training not only in martial art but also in poetry and dance; they were given high positions in the King's service.]

At any rate, the symposium received a general assessment that it was a meaningful exercise. Before it was held, however, there had been direct and indirect attempts by the authorities to obstruct the holding of such a

symposium; that, it is said, had driven Academy Superintendent Kim to launch counterargument at times and to explode in anger at other times.

Mr Kim's personal disposition subsequent to the birth of the Fifth Republic gave rise to a flurry of wild rumors alleging his "imprisonment," "disappearance," and even "having been shot by an assassin." It was amid this kind of atmosphere that in late 1981 he was persuaded to retire from active duty and place himself on the reserve. His retirement ceremony was held on 15 January 1982 at the Military Academy.

That day, following the ceremony held in the auditorium of the academy, marking General Kim Pok-tong's retirement from active service as well as the change of superintendent, a quiet cocktail party reportedly was held, attended by some 30 guests and the staff and faculty of the academy.

It was during the cocktail party--so goes the story--that Mr Kim shed some tears, overcome by the emotion mixed with a sense of remorse of a man closing the book on his 30-year military career; that Madame Im, his wife, was soon sobbing; and that General Wickham, commanding general of the U.S. Eighth Army, and Mrs Wickham, both of whom had maintained deep friendship with General Kim, were also seen teary-eyed. But most of all, Madame Kim Ok-suk, the wife of No Tae-u who is now the DJP president, was heard sobbing the loudest, spreading sorrowful air all around her. Before coming to his retirement ceremony, General Kim had made a courtesy call on Army Chief of Staff Hwang Yong-si (now director of the Office of Inspection) at the Army Headquarters; while going through the formality of reporting to General Hwang of his retirement, General Kim was said to have made no effort to hide his running tears.

Once Around the Drill Field on Shoulders of Graduating Cadets

Early April, either the 1st or 2nd day of the month, Mr Kim received an invitation to the graduation ceremony of the Military Academy's 38th class. Since retiring, he had been leading a quiet life--doing nothing much other than reading; so he decided to accept the invitation, especially because he had had a hand in the training of the 38th class. On 6 April, the day of graduation, he arrived at the academy around 9:30 in the morning and observed the ceremony from his designated seat in the rear. About 2-3 minutes after the ceremony was over, one graduate rushed over to where Mr Kim was, saluted, and said in a loud voice, "The graduates are waiting to pay their respect to you, Sir, Mr Superintendent!" He casually followed the graduate to where other graduates were waiting in formation. No sooner did he arrive there than numerous graduates surrounded him and lifted him up on their shoulders. "Get me down!" said Mr Kim but to no avail.

Carrying Mr Kim on their shoulders, the graduates circled the drill field once, then put him down, and then requested him to give them a word of advice. Mr Kim reportedly obliged them with a brief, formal address of the standard variety, after which he bid them farewell. Later, several of the

graduates were subjected to an investigation but none of them punished because it was established that the whole affair was totally spontaneous in nature.

Remarks at Press Conference Caused a Stir

About a month later, the incredibly shocking Chang Yong-cha scandal broke, which involved fraudulent handling of bank drafts amounting to hundreds of billions of won. In its aftermath, President Yi Kyu-kwang of the Mining Promotion Corporation was removed from the job and replaced by Mr Kim.

It was on the morning of 13 May 1982 that Mr Kim received word of his appointment from Minister of Energy and Resources Yi Son-ki. At the time he was playing golf but was told to come to the ministry for a press conference. He tried to beg off, saying, "Who am I to deserve a press conference, anyway!?" But when told by the minister that the reporters were already standing by, he had no choice: he cut his golf game short, went to the ministry, and held a press conference. But, according to sources close to Mr Kim, the contents of the press conference, as was reported by newspapers, put Mr Kim in a difficult situation.

Responding to a reporter's question, "Did you think you would be returning to another official job?", Mr Kim had replied, "The decision was not mine, but as I had committed no major mistakes in the past, I thought I might be given an opportunity to do some more work."

What later became a point of contention was the part of reply where he had said, "...as I had committed no major mistakes." It reportedly made some to retort: "Does that mean that others have committed minor mistakes?"

Also, in response to another question during the press conference, "What was your guiding creed while you were in military service?", Mr Kim had replied: "I have always believed that truth lies in things that are ordinary. I believe that rewards are due for those who make earnest efforts within the bounds of common sense." The "...within the bounds of common sense" portion was said to have led to a misunderstanding; some reportedly accused him of having implied by that statement that there were in fact many things going on that were outside the bounds of common sense.

Mr No Tae-u, whose retirement from active military service with the rank of four-star general had preceded Mr Kim's by 6 months, was serving as minister of home affairs when Mr Kim became president of the Mining Promotion Corporation. Mr Kum Chin-ho (age 56; later became minister of trade and industry), another brother-in-law of Mr Kim's, was at the time serving as vice minister of trade and industry.

Mr Kim, who in the wake of the "26 October" incident strongly called for democratization more than mere stabilization, shied away from the usual social activities after assuming the presidency at the Mining Promotion Corporation; instead, he began devoting his time and energy to academic pursuit.

"I Trust You"--His Leadership Motto

In August 1982 Mr Kim completed the graduate course in business administration (the course intended for the highest-echelon managers) at Seoul University; following spring he enrolled for the graduate course in government administration at Yonsei University, which he completed in August 1985 and earned a master's degree in foreign relations and security; he then completed in late 1985 the course for high-level policymakers at the graduate school for government administration, Yonsei University; and in June 1987 he completed the course for the highest-level business managers at Koryo University's graduate school for business administration.

Despite his continued devotion to academic pursuit, there have been rumors in town, according to one version of which he is alleged to "have suffered a set-back in his career, indulged in heavy drinking, and completely ruined himself."

Since assuming the management responsibility at the Mining Promotion Corporation, Mr Kim has been dealing with his staff and employees based on his belief that only with a leadership approach of "I trust you"--a motto he had used as a guiding principle during his military days--and sincere human relations can one hope to generate awesome productivity from those working for him. As a result, there is a wide-spread feeling of friendship and affinity toward him among his many employees, and according to sources close to him.

Professor Hwang Chan-ho (Seoul University), who had served as a professor for many years at the Military Academy, had the following words of praise about Mr Kim, one of his old students: "Everywhere he went, he was very popular among his men--so much so that he acquired a reputation as a man who had managed to instill an air of harmony in all the military units he had ever served with."

National Assembly member Kim Sik (DJP), an old classmate of Mr Kim's at the academy, had a somewhat different recollection: "True Mr Kim enjoyed the trust and confidence of not only his classmates but his seniors and juniors as well; he was also a man of strong nerve--more than average; but, most of all, I recall him as a man of superior action power."

For a man of these reputed characters, Mr Kim has been leading an unusually cautious life since becoming the head of the Mining Promotion Corporation, limiting his outside contacts to only a small number of individuals. He even refrained from seeing Mr No Tae-u, his old classmate and brother-in-law. That he broke this pattern and has had several discreet meetings with Mr No Tae-u subsequent to the DJP convention held on 10 June seems to have been a reflection of his sincere concern about the political situation, unless checked, could very well lead to a catastrophe."

Incidentally, Mr Kim was shaken by a totally unexpected incident having a bearing on the political situation, which occurred subsequent to the issuance of the "29 June" declaration.

The shocking incident occurred in mid-July: one day, his third daughter Chi-su (age 20; a sophomore student at Ihwa Women's University) came home from school and faced him with this question: "Father, today at school I read 'big character posters' in which you were identified as one of the five traitors. How did this happen?" According to a source close to him, Mr Kim did not provide his daughter with any explanation one way or the other, but he seemed to be in a state of melancholy for a period of time following that incident. "That Mr Kim is not in any way involved with those of the leading power element is a fact well known to those who are in the position to know, is it not?" the same source asked, rhetorically.

Mr Kim has four daughters, no sons. The oldest daughter (Mi-hi) and the second one (Mi-kyong) are already married; the youngest one is a student at Hanyang University.

His long academic pursuit over the past 5 years has got him deeply interested in social issues as well, but when it came to the question of how he might be envisaging the phase of his life yet to unfold, he remained closemouthed throughout the interview.

But when I heard him say, more than once, the words to the effect that "a perverted society that allows an anomaly to be viewed as a norm can be saved only when the process of democratization is accomplished," a fleeting notion came to me that he might possibly throw himself into the world of politics one day--if and when an opportunity presents itself.

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RESERVE FORCES TRAINING PROGRAM DISCUSSED

Seoul ANJON POJANG [NATIONAL SECURITY] in Korean May 87 pp 57-60

[Article by Sin Yong-ho, officer in charge of education, the Education and Training Section, the Ministry of Home Affairs: "Civil Defense Education and Training"]

[Text] A. Outline of Education and Training

1. Definition of Education and Training, and the Basis for Its Implementation

Civil defense education and training refers to teaching Civil Defense Corps members spiritual armament, general knowledge, and principles of action necessary for the protection of lives and property of inhabitants under a civil defense status. Its implementation is based on Section 1, Article 21 of the current Basic Civil Defense Law.

2. Education and Training Plans

In accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Basic Civil Defense Law, each year the minister of home affairs formulates education and training plans (hours, contents, methods are decided) for the following year and instructs city government and provincial governors in them.

City, provincial, and county officials formulate detailed training plans in accordance with the education and training plans formulated by the Minister of home affairs, and report their plans and, following this, implement them.

3. Objects of Education and Training

Civil defense education and training involves all members of the Civil Defense Corps. However, those who are serving prison sentences and heavier penalties, those who are traveling or staying in foreign countries, drivers of means of public transportation (buses), and those who participate in rebuilding after disasters, and other persons are exempted from education and training. Of these, those who have special skills related to civil defense such as medicine, electricity, communications, and other

skills can be exempted by the Minister of Home Affairs from education and training in their area of specialized skill.

4. Education and Training Periods

Civil defense education and training periods are implemented each year by the decision of the Minister of Home Affairs who implements training within the limit of 10 days and a total of 50 hours per year. In this case, the Minister of Home Affairs may extend the hours of education and training, if necessary, for staff members, and technical and skilled staff members of the Civil Defense Corps, and he may implement education and training at other locations.

However, it is provided that during the election of presidential electors and the election of the president and National Assembly civil defense education and training are not to be implemented.

5. Education and Training Calls

Call Methods

When education and training of Civil Defense Corps members is to be implemented, in accordance with the provisions of laws and ordinances, education and training notices must be transmitted to the persons concerned. Only in case the persons concerned are absent may the education and training notices be transmitted to household heads or adult family members in the case of regional Civil Defense Corps, and to heads of work places in the case of work place Civil Defense Corps units.

Persons Entitled to Make Calls

Chief mayors and block leaders must transmit calls through commanders of Civil Defense Corps units to which they belong, in order to send civil defense education and training notices to concerned persons at their residences (mayor and county executives in the case of work place members). This must be done 7 days prior to the implementation of education and training. Notices must also be transmitted to staff members, technical and skilled personnel of the Civil Defense Corps through commanders of Civil Defense Corps units 7 days prior to the implementation.

B. 1987 Management of Civil Defense Education

Civil defense education for this year is being executed with the goals of maximizing the efficiency of civil defense education by reducing daily inconveniences of Civil Defense Corps members, by implementing practical education, and on the other end, in nurturing all Civil Defense Corps members as nucleus organizations of national security and social stability by improving their skill in managing different types of situation.

As to education periods, 10 hours per year are divided into the first half and the second half, and cities, provincial governors, city mayors, county governors, and ward chiefs formulate education programs to suit the practical situations in their respective areas, decide education periods, and implement education. Thus, they aim at the greatest reduction in the difficulties caused to members by civil defense education.

In order to manage substantive civil defense education free of inconvenience, education methods, contents, and facilities at education sites are being improved to carry out more substantive education.

New measures to be implemented this year are as follows:

1. Permanent classroom management and human education place management.

Separate education places are secured in urban areas with a population of over 100,000 as permanent classrooms, which are managed for a certain periods of time. Education is given on dates desired by members within the limit of 1 to 2 weeks.

Also, the contents of education are formulated with diversity with 1 week or 3 to 4 days as the unit, and managed so as to let members learn necessary subjects at necessary hours. Civil petition offices are established within permanent classrooms so that simple civil petitions that can be handled on the same day as the education can be disposed of.

On the other hand, in cities with a population of over 200,000 or in urban areas that so desire, evening classrooms are managed to allow Civil Defense Corps members who are occupied during daytime receive civil defense education in the evening for the convenience sake of their daily work.

2. Formation of Proper Education Teams and Management

In the past education teams were managed without differentiation between youth and adults with fathers and sons sometimes attending the same classes. This year such education management will be abolished. In an attempt to implement education to suit the subjects, education teams will be divided into youth teams for those 17-25 years and the adult teams for those 36-45 years. The capacity of the team will be organized to accomodate 50 to 300 members depending on the scale of local conditions and the scale of facilities.

3. Improvement of Environment for Civil Defense Education Places

This year marks the completion of the 3-year plan for civil defense education facilities begun in 1985. Thus, we try to see to it that 70 percent of all members receive education without inconvenience at special education places and special education or designated education places such as city, county, and civic auditoriums with an improved environment for education facilities. We are also letting the facilities for special

education places be used as various local resident education centers such as new community education and women's education places at regional units.

4. Local Traveling Education Management

For members in rural areas with inconvenient transportation, education places are managed with the educational districts and the road transportation areas as the units, so that they can receive education at places convenient for attendance.

Also, for members in isolated islands and in remote mountainous areas, using the village or city as the unit, administrative organs will transport lecture education and equipment directly to local areas to manage local education.

5. Diversification of Educational Contents and Methods, and Expansion of National Education

Plans call for formulating educational contents to suit local characteristics such as cities, farming and fishing villages, areas subject to constant flood damages, and areas surrounding nuclear power plants, and for expanding audio-visual education by using video tapes with lectures by noted personalities and action principles for different types of disasters. Policy also calls for reinforcing the basic content of civil defense education in primary, middle, and high school textbooks to guide people from childhood to learn and practice civil defense, for expanding general education, including the use of gas and extinguishers in connection with daily lives for women's organization and employees of public places.

Diversification of Educational Lecturers and Establishment of Educational Discipline

Commissioning educational lecturers should be carried out by securing well-qualified lecturers with two or three neighboring cities or counties as one district. Lecturers should include college professors, noted persons in the specialized fields, heads of agencies, military officers, and staff members of research organizations. At the same time, lecture allowances have been raised to 20,000 won per hour. At the newly established Central Civil Defense School lectures for spiritual education and short education courses for practical instructors have been prepared.

On the other hand, in order to upgrade the efficacy of member education, sanctions against proxy participation, tardy participation, leaving early, and absentees from the basic education have been carried out along with the strengthening of educational supervision of work place civil defense education have been carried out.

In addition, in order to specialize civil defense education, the Central Civil Defense School was opened in Ch'onan City. At this school high-level specialized education is being given in 18 courses to 1,515

lecturers, 6,790 regional and work place civil defense commanders and members, 940 public officials in charge, a total of 9,245 persons. Thus, at this school a scientific and specialized educational system is being developed and is progressing in order for the school to perform fully its functions as a cradle for nurturing elite civil defense staff members both in form and substance.

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MANAGERS FRANTICALLY SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO LABOR DISPUTES

41070247 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 19 Aug 87 p 5

[Text] With some 20 days gone by since labor disputes began spreading nationwide, business managers are holding all sorts of meetings and conferences in a desperate effort to take an interim look at what has actually transpired thus far on the labor scene and to formulate appropriate counter-measures.

Big corporations as well as small businesses, each in their own way, are examining the causes of the disputes, are holding skull sessions day-in day-out in order to share "the wisdom for solutions," and are discussing a variety of ideas toward resolving the problems.

Such gatherings of business managers are nothing new; what is new is a sudden change of attitude of those businesses that have in the past shown little interest in such meetings: realizing the general trend toward further spreading of labor disputes, even they are now faithfully attending all such meetings, paying close attention to the substance of discussions taking place there.

While watching with a great deal of interest the progress being achieved by and the changes taking place at those companies that have already settled their labor disputes, what these managers are stressing is the importance of arriving at "definitive solutions" free of inherent flaws that could rekindle the dispute later.

As the labor-management disputes have continued to spread despite some signs of nearing settlements, those in the business sector, who are racking their brains in search of proper countermeasures, are holding one meeting after another in order to share their experiences in dealing with labor disputes.

The National Federation of Economic Organizations has been holding a series of scheduled and nonscheduled meetings with concerned business representatives in an effort to take stock of and to synthesize the business-sector posture. The Federation-sponsored monthly meeting of corporate chairmen's groups, held during the daytime on 19 August, was wholly devoted to the discussion of latest developments on the labor scene.

The meeting was attended by some 40 prominent business leaders--corporate chairmen, advisors, and standing directors, who discussed not only the causes and progress of the labor disputes but a variety of ideas on how to solve them as well.

The federation already prepared a message of appeal to the workers but has decided to hold off making the appeal public pending further review in the light of some earnest movements toward settlements as evidenced in the fact that the labor dispute involving the Hyondae Group has now entered into a negotiating phase.

Some business leaders are grumbling that the absence of proper counterparts on the labor side, with whom they can develop a dialogue, makes negotiations difficult, and that even if negotiations were held and a settlement reached, it would not be a "real settlement" and, therefore, the possibility of recurrence would remain.

These business leaders point out that some companies, where the labor disputes have already been settled, were driven by the crisis mentality of "the fire must be put out" and rushed themselves into "unreasonable" settlements, and that, therefore, the possibility cannot be ruled out that these companies could end up in a quagmire of more serious problems in the event they should fail to implement the terms of their commitments. They are also unanimously of the view that even if a settlement is reached for the moment, what is more important is what happens following such a settlement."

In this connection, some of these business leaders are said to have instructed their company staff to "continue to watch closely the movement of the workers while maintaining a positive posture for a dialogue."

In another development, on 19 August, the Korea Chamber of Commerce sponsored a discussion meeting on the theme of "The Current Status of the Labor Dispute and the Direction of Countermeasures." The meeting, which was held at the chamber's club beginning at 8 o'clock in the morning, drew more than 200 business representatives, forcing the sponsor to add extra seats to accommodate them. The roaring success of this meeting was a direct reflection of the extent of the business sector's interest in and concern over the current labor dispute which to them is a burning problem as urgent as "shirttail on fire."

Scheduled to speak at this meeting were President Son Sang-mo of Hyosong Heavy Industries and President Kim Sang-hun of Hyondae Precision Engineering; both of these companies have had labor problems lately and the two presidents were to talk about their personal experiences in dealing with such problems. Perhaps this was the reason why so many representatives and officials in charge of personnel and labor matters came to this meeting from the companies that have not yet faced labor disputes of their own. They not only listened attentively to a two-and-a-half hour long presentation by the speaker but followed it with a vigorous give-and-take discussion as well. Also notable

was the presence in the audience of such prominent business figures as Kang Sin-ho, president of Tongyang Pharmaceutical; Yi Maeng-ki, chairman of Taehan Shipping; Chi Tong-pom, president of Hanguk Paper Manufacturing; Yu Chae-un, president of Paekkwang Chemicals; and Yi Yun-ki, president of Sambo Computers.

In his presentation, President Son of Hyosong Heavy Industries cited the inequitable distribution of the fruit of economic growth as the primary cause of the labor-management dispute: "It cannot be denied that the businesses are guilty of having neglected to improve the treatment of the workers," he said. He then confessed: "I found my workers too ignorant of the realities facing the company, but then I realized it was the fault of the company management, who failed to make the effort to make the workers understand the realities." These candid revelations based on his personal experience struck the sympathetic cords of many in the audience.

He then made the following special point: "The truth is, not only is personnel and labor management an area for which companies are ill prepared, it is an area ignored by top-level managers; consequently, individuals well-qualified for the job have been reluctant to assume the responsibility." In the final analysis, he concluded, what is needed most urgently is the restoring of mutual trust between the labor and the management.

He also revealed an incident that came to light during the labor dispute at his company and urged other business leaders to be on guard against similar incidents: he said that a man who had led the hardline faction during the dispute turned out to be a bogus employee (he was a former university student, expelled during his senior year) who had been on the company payroll for 2 months under an alias, and that this man has since disappeared.

Meanwhile, to the disappointment of the audience, President Kim of Hyundai Precision Engineering, who was the other scheduled speaker, was unable to attend the meeting due to the press of business related to the effort to resolve the labor dispute at his company. Just the same, this discussion meeting is said to have been very beneficial to those whose companies have yet to face labor disputes of their own.

In the small-business sector, 282 companies in this category have been struck by labor disputes thus far nationwide: of them, 138 have reached settlements but the remaining 144 are, as of 17 August, still involved in various forms of labor unrest such as worker sit-ins.

The geographical distribution of small businesses struck by labor disputes is as follows: South Kyongsang Province has had 104 cases of which 72 are still in progress; the Seoul-Inchon region has had 48 cases (21 cases still in progress); Kangwon Province has had 43 cases (22 cases still in progress); North Kyongsang Province has had 27 cases (13 cases still in progress), and North and South Chungchong and North and South Cholla provinces each has had 3-9 cases.

According to an analysis undertaken by the National Federation of the Associations of Small Businesses, the underlying causes of the labor disputes are as follows: demand for higher wages and bonuses in 239 cases or 85 percent of the total; demand for holidays with pay (11 cases); demand for the payment of wages in arrears (11 cases); demand related to unionization or to company-controlled union (8 cases); demand for commuter-bus service for the employees (4 cases); demand for better working hours (3 cases); other demands (6 cases).

These small businesses, too, are encountering the same problem that has been plaguing big businesses: that is, the workers have been launching strikes without any attempt to negotiate first. This "strike first, negotiate afterward" approach used by the workers in the majority of cases has been the cause of extra headaches for those on the management side. Moreover, the inadequate negotiating skills on both sides are reportedly delaying the settlement of disputes.

In the meantime, as part of the effort to resolve labor-management disputes, the National Federation of the Associations of Small Businesses has set up a "special committee to promote labor-management cooperation." The special committee held its first meeting on 19 August and agreed on four guiding principles including the principle of seeking resolutions through dialogue and the policy of approving lawful unionization moves.

Meanwhile, it is reported that, since the first signs of spreading labor disputes, the General Federation of Business Managers of Korea has been swamped with inquiries from business executives concerning the question of labor management. It is also said that even those businesses that had shown little interest in the activity of the federation are now showing a great deal of interest as evident in their faithful participation in the federation-sponsored activities.

For example, the "meeting to discuss emergency countermeasures for labor-management disputes," which was held on the afternoon of 18 August at the federation's conference room, was attended by representatives of 50 some companies--far more than the sponsor had expected, forcing the federation staff into a last-minute scramble for extra chairs to accommodate the overflow audience.

The focus of the discussions at the meeting was on the actual status of the labor disputes and economic losses resulting from these disputes. In this connection, the federation sources are saying, "First we plan to come to firm grips with the facts of the disputes and share among ourselves the experiences gained in the handling of the disputes; only then do we intend to look for the means for dealing with the situation."

It is also reported that the federation plans to organize a special countermeasure committee comprised of experts within the business community for a two-fold task of coming to grips with the existing conditions in each of the following subject areas and producing recommendations on how to improve them: the wage structure; the working conditions; the system of processing the worker's grievances; personnel management; and industrial safety.

RISING UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF COLLEGE GRADUATES REPORTED

Trend Worsening

41070248 Seoul HANKUK ILBO in Korean 16 Jul 87 p 2

[Text] Despite the buoyant economy's salutary effects on the overall employment picture and jobless rate, the unemployment rate among those with higher education of the college level and above has been rising every year.

In other developments, as a result of the ever advancing industrialization, last year, for the first time, the number of workers employed in the mining and manufacturing sectors exceeded that of the combined work forces in the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.

According to an economic-activity-related demographic trend report for 1986, published 15 July by the Economic Planning Board, of the total age-15-and-above population of 28,225,000, those who were employed numbered 15,505,000, and those who wanted to work but failed to find jobs numbered 611,000. These figures, when compared with the equivalent numbers for 1985, represented an increase of 535,000 in the employed column and a decline of 11,000 in the jobless column.

But a breakdown by education level of the unemployed revealed that 201,000 were junior-high graduates or below, 286,000 were senior-high graduates or below, 124,000 were college graduates or above. What is of particular significance is the yearly increase in the number of jobless among college graduates--from 82,000 in 1984 to 109,000 in 1985 and then to 122,000 (as published] in 1986; this phenomenon has now brought forth a new social problem.

Meanwhile the overall jobless rate registered a decline of 0.2 percent, from 4 percent in 1985 to 3.8 percent in 1986.

The composition of the work force by industrial category showed that there were 4,013,000 workers employed in the mining and manufacturing sectors, an increase of 453,000 over 1985, and that those employed in the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries totaled 3,662,000, a decline of 71,000 from 1985. These figures provided a telling proof that the booming economy had caused a major demographic shift from the rural sector to the industrial sector during the course of 1986.

As a result, whereas in 1985 the work force in the mining and manufacturing sectors numbered 74,000 less than that in the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, in 1986 the former surpassed the latter by 373,000 [as published] for the first time on record.

Causes Analyzed

41070248 Seoul MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN in Korean 17 Jul 87 p 2

[Text] For any nation, a rising level of formal schooling attained by its people and the resulting growth in intellectual manpower are welcome developments at all times. But the problem lies in the question of how to take full advantage of these highly educated, intellectual human resources without keeping them idle.

Today, in our country, as a result of ubiquitous presence of colleges and popularization of the higher education, about 37 percent of our high school graduates are entering colleges, indeed. In this respect, our country is second only to the United States, where the ratio is 43 percent. Unquestionably it is encouraging that our youths are so hungry for higher education, that they are striving to be the foremost in absorbing knowledge and information, and that they are so highly motivated in mastering science and technology.

There was a period in our past when the zeal for higher education was so excessive and competition so keen that its adverse impact on the economy and society as well as possible backlash were a matter of concern--so much so it even generated an expression "education mania could invite national ruin." Be that as it may, it does not seem too unreasonable to say that, in the final analysis, the higher standard of education deserves a lion's share of the credit for having laid the foundation for so fast an economic growth and social development as we are seeing today.

It is only logical, one must admit, that those with a higher level of education are apt to be ahead of others with a lesser level of education in not only absorbing advanced knowledges developed by foreign countries but also learning sciences and technologies in general.

But it is just as true to say that we now have a serious problem that has grown out of such a mass production of highly-educated individuals who are, instead of being absorbed into the job market in a timely and effective manner, being kept idle and thus becoming a cause of growing social pressure. Of course part of the blame for this must go to the fragility of our industrial structure, but to be blamed just as much, if not more, is the way college graduates have been mass-produced without regard to, and in the absence of, any planning on the actual needs for such well-educated individuals within the overall manpower supply-and-demand picture throughout the entire industrial sector.

Right now we are in the middle of a cumulative rise in the number of jobless among college graduates--a trend that began in 1985. As of 1986, the jobless rate in this group exceeded 8 percent, representing more than 122,000 persons in number.

That, despite the yearly improvement in the overall employment picture helped by the buoyant economy, the number of jobless among college graduates has been increasing by more than 20,000 each year is nothing short of a phenomenon warranting special attention. This surely is a great loss, no matter how it is viewed--whether from the standpoint of the individuals directly affected or from the standpoint of the nation as a whole.

A careful examination of the problem seems to indicate that this phenomenon cannot be attributed entirely to either the fragility of our industrial structure or the lack of planning with respect to the supply-and-demand factors governing the highly-educated manpower. Part of the cause may be rooted in the inability of our society--the social structure itself and all the enterprises within it--to free itself from the traditional traits of according special preferences to individuals with a high level of education. Yet another part of the cause may be traceable to those highly-educated individuals themselves for having failed to instill in themselves a proper attitude and a proper sense of basic values vis-a-vis jobs and labor.

Regardless, it is no time for finger-pointing--the situation is too urgent for that. The reality is this: While junior- and senior-high graduates are in short supply on the job market, there is an over supply of college graduates who are going idle. To those jobless college graduates, this problem may, in some respect, very well be a matter far more real and pressing than the issue of democratization over which everyone is so excited right now.

In any event, this is no problem which can be treated lackadaisically by the nation and the society; it must be viewed as a problem, the solution to which will have to be worked out by everyone putting their heads together.

Prospects Poor

41070248 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 20 Aug 87 p 2

[Text] With major corporate groups planning to keep their hiring of college graduates in the second half of this year at the level either slightly higher than or same as the hiring level of last year, it seems unlikely that employment opportunities for college graduates will be improving to any significant degree.

According to a survey of corporate groups, conducted on 20 August, regarding their planned levels of new hiring of college graduates to take place during the month of November, only a handful of groups, such as Hyondae, Lucky-Kumsong, Samsong, Taeu, Ssangyong, and Ko-O-Rong, intend to increase the

level slightly over the last year's level--each by some 20 to 200, while a fair number of them, including Hanguk Sunpowder, Songyong, Hanil Synthetic Fibers, and the Tongbu Group, plan to limit the hiring at the same level as last year's.

In analyzing the situation, many in the business sector agreed that, despite the booming economy which grew no less than 15.3 percent in the first half of this year, the corporate groups are now gearing up to the expected turn for the worse in the economy as a result of the deteriorating "three low phenomena" [the low price of oil, the low value of the U.S. dollar, and the low rate of inflation] coupled with the recent spread of labor-management disputes, and that therefore they are unlikely to increase the level of new hiring by any significant degree.

The planned new hirings of college graduates by individual corporate groups for the second half of this year are as follows: The Lucky-Kumsong Group plans to hire 2,850 which is 350 more than the 2,500 hired last year; the Hyundai Group plans to hire 2,500 which is 200 more than the 2,300 hired last year; the Taeu Group plans to hire 2,000 which is just about 150 more than the 1,849 hired last year; the Hyosong Group plans to increase the hiring by 100 over the last year's level; the Samsung and the Ssangyong groups each plan to hire 50 more than it did last year; other groups such as Tusan, Kumho, Taerim, and Ko-O-Rong plan to increase their hirings only by some 20 to 30 each.

In addition, a fair number of other corporate groups including Songyong, Hanil Synthetic Fibers, and Hanguk Gunpowder are being prevented from increasing their new hirings for fear of less-than-favorable economic outlook ahead.

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OPINION POLL: 'VOICE OF MIDDLE CLASS PEOPLES'

Results Published

41070236 Seoul HANKUK ILBO in Korean 9 Jun 87 pp 10-11

[Text] Changes in Public Sentiment--The Korean people today seem to regard the present state as either a crisis or transition period. That is why people from all walks of life have recently voiced their opinion continuously, and many group activities have sprung up all over the country. It seems that we can vividly realize the true meaning of crisis, pain and transition. If so, we should take a closer look at what's in the mind of the middle class today regarding such demonstrations and claims. We have looked at nine demonstrations and claims that have recently surfaced in our society, and surveyed a full range of reactions from the "highly sympathetic" to the "extremely negative." The survey shows that when those in the "highly sympathetic" and "sympathetic" categories are combined, more than half of the middle class feel sympathetic to all demonstrations and claims. Of those, 89 percent of the middle class today agree with peasants who protest fluctuations in price of live-stock. The absolute majority of the middle class people think the peasants' protests are legitimate. Another movement that is receiving a strong support is the protest against the TV audition fee.

Such a trend in public opinion suggests that today's middle class people are taking a cut and dried attitude in criticizing the present situation. It is particularly noteworthy that today's middle class people in Korea are not only concerned about their own interest in basic human rights based on civil liberties, but also have shown a great deal of interest in the claims of peasants and laborers. Considering that they have given their strongest support to the peasants' demonstrations, we can see that the middle class is deeply concerned about economic survival as much as they are concerned about the civil liberties. Even if the middle class themselves might not be threatened by the issues of survival rights, the fact that they are interested in realizing the basic human rights in connection with survival rights of other classes and groups could play an important role in understanding today's Korean middle class. In addition, the middle class' support for the protest against the TV audition fee was, by and large, expected, but we should keep in mind that this is also a strong reflection of their critical minds against the press today.

Then, what could be the reflection of such critical minds in the area of democratization? Assuming that it is the middle class people that are most anxious about democratization in Korea, we need to examine their opinions about what is keeping this country from a smooth transition to democratization. We have listed the following eight elements, which might be responsible for the slow process of democratization: the government party, the primary opposition party, other opposition parties, the administration, the non-government circles, the military, the general public, and others. The question was: who would be most responsible for the slow progress? Of course, another optional answer to this question was "the democratization process is moving smoothly."

Surprisingly, only 1 percent of the respondents believe the democratization process is going smoothly. And an overwhelming 44 percent of the respondents said the government party is responsible for the slow progress in democratization. In other words, the middle class believes that the government party is most responsible for the failure of smooth progress. The second is the military (18 percent), followed by the general public (13 percent) and the administration (8 percent). After the "other" category, the least responsible element is the non-government circles, with 0.7 percent. In other words, this means that there is little connection between today's non-democratic government and the non-government circles, while the government party and the non-democratic government are most closely related. It is noteworthy that the primary opposition party, too, is not irresponsible. About 7 percent of the respondents blame the primary opposition party.

Let's take a look at the evaluation of the four established parties. In particular, we need to examine an indirect evaluation of the newly created Reunification Democratic Party (RDP). Regarding solutions to the two pending issues of democratization and the wealth differentials, we asked: To what extent do you think the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), and the Nationalist Party (NP) would contribute? There were four kinds of answers available, ranging from "significantly" to "not at all."

First of all, let's examine the responses to the question of democratization. Here again, we were surprised to see that an extremely small number of respondents, only 3-17 percent, said that the four established parties will make a significant contribution.

For the "significant contribution" category, the RDP received 17 percent, the DJP received 12 percent, the NKDP received only 5 percent, and the NP received only 3 percent. Although the greatest public expectation is with the new RDP, we can see that there is a significant lack of confidence in all four established parties.

Combination of the "significant contribution" and the "somewhat significant contribution" categories makes the trend of public opinion somewhat more precise. Of those who said the four parties will contribute to democratization, 63 percent went for RDP, 46 percent for DJP, 44 percent for NKDP, and 32 percent for NP.

What is interesting here is that there is a big difference in support for the RDP and the NKDP, from which the RDP was born. Today's middle class is more critical about the ambiguous opposition parties than the ruling government party.

Such a trend can also be seen in the public opinion regarding the parties' expected contribution to solutions of the wealth differential problem. Responses to the combined answers of "significant contribution" and "somewhat significant contribution" were: 49 percent for RDP, 47 percent for DJP, 39 percent for NKDP, and 34 percent for NP.

For solutions in the wealth differential problem, the primary opposition party and the ruling government party received almost the same evaluation. However, the people are more critical, once again, about the other opposition parties. Here, too, it is noteworthy that the people, today's middle class in particular, don't believe the established parties will play any significant role in solving the wealth differential problem. More than 50 percent of the respondents feel negatively about the parties' ability to solve the wealth differential problem. Such a lack of confidence in the political parties might lead to a bleak outlook for democratization in Korea. Hence, we wish the political parties had become active and recovered their political abilities.

Then, what could be the public sentiment on other political and social organizations? For this, the following question was asked.

"The following is a list of major organizations or systems in our society. What do you think of their role today?"

The seven organizations were: the president, the administration, the National Assembly, the judicial branch, the press, the police, and labor unions. For each organization, the following five answers were available: "Too strong," "Strong," "Appropriate," "Weak," and "Very weak."

The overall responses were clear. The following results show the "too strong" category for each organization: 51 percent for the president, 28 percent for the administration, 23 percent for the police, 5 percent for the judicial branch, 4 percent for the National Assembly, 2 percent for the press, and 0.4 percent for labor unions.

The "strong" category had the following results: 89 percent for the president, 76 percent for the administration, 65 percent for the police, 20 percent for the judicial branch, 17 percent for the National Assembly, 7 percent for the press, and 6 percent for labor unions.

The order is still the same as before. The large gap between "the police" and "the judicial branch" presents a break point. Today's middle class think the roles of the administration and the police have grown too much. On the other hand, they think the power of the judicial and legislative bodies have been overshadowed, and the power of the press and the labor unions is nearly nonexistent.

In order to obtain a clear answer for the negative weakness of the press, we asked whether "the freedom of speech is guaranteed in Korea." Only 3 percent of the respondents said "yes." Nearly 83 percent said "no" or "not in general." Thus, the absolute majority believes there is no freedom of speech in Korea.

Then, what can be expected from a National Assembly that is relatively weak? We asked, "What type of task would you like to have your next assemblyman address? (Choose only one answer.)" The choices were: "political democratization," "resolution of wealth differential," "reunification with North Korea," "promotion of welfare for local districts," "economic growth," "national independence in international affairs," and "other." Fifty percent of the respondents said they would vote for the person who will address the issue of political democratization. The next winners were in the categories of the "resolution of wealth differential" and the "promotion of welfare for local districts" with 16 percent each. The following is the result: 50 percent for "political democratization," 16 percent for "resolution of wealth differential," 16 percent for "promotion of welfare for local districts," 7 percent for "economic growth," 6 percent for "national independence in international affairs," 4 percent for "reunification with North Korea," and 2 percent for "other."

Next, let's examine the middle class' reaction to today's political issues. We asked, "According to the present constitution, a new administration is to be installed in February 1988 when the current presidential term expires. To what extent do you think such a transition of the government will contribute to the political progress in Korea?" The answers were: (1) significant contribution (12 percent); (2) some contribution (39 percent); (3) not much (35 percent); and (4) none (14 percent).

As this response shows, the middle class' opinion on this issue is sharply divided with a ratio of 51 to 49. This can be interpreted as the public reluctance to attach a special meaning to such a political transition because it is a natural thing to do anyway.

Now, let's find out the middle class' opinion on external affairs. In order to examine the degree of political independence and economic dependence of Korea in relation with other countries, we asked the following questions with four possible answers ranging from "yes" to "no."

The first question was whether "other countries exert a lot of political influence on Korea." Nearly 48 percent of the respondents said "yes," and 46 percent said "somewhat." This means that the absolute majority of 96 percent of the respondents acknowledge, at least indirectly, the external influence on Korean politics. Of course, this can be interpreted as an open-door politics rather than as a political dependence, but most of the respondents seem to have based their answers on Korea's relationship with powerful countries.

The second question was whether "Korea is economically dependent on foreign countries." This question tends to arouse a sense of humiliation. Nearly 81 percent of the respondents gave a positive answer to this question. This indicates that the majority of the middle class admit that Korea is economically dependent on powerful countries.

Then, what could be their opinion about America in particular? When asked whether "America is more interested in its own interests rather than the political progress in Korea," 51 percent said "yes" and 39 percent said "some-what." Thus, the absolute majority of 90 percent of the people recognize U.S. self-interest. They know very well that America is more concerned about its own economic and military interests than about freedom, human rights, justice, and democratization in Korea. This is a significant change from the past opinion that America is one of the Korea's blood-brother friends that fought for our freedom during the Korean war.

The middle class' view on America is accurate. That is why they don't always welcome U.S. criticism occasionally given on our democratization process.

When asked whether "it is desirable to have U.S. criticism on democratization of Korea," only 34 percent of the respondents gave a positive answer, while 66 percent felt negatively.

It seems that the middle class wants to be cautious in expressing its opinions, while keeping a close observation on the true meaning of the criticism. In fact, anti-American sentiment has recently become widespread among the young intellectuals. Furthermore, among the established generation of the middle class, the romantic era of the beautiful America seems to be gradually fading. The Korean middle class today seem to value highly national independence.

Now, let's examine the middle class' feelings on reunification. In general, they are pessimistic about the possibilities of reunification. About three-fourths of all respondents believe "reunification with North Korea is practically impossible because its systematic difference from that of South Korea is too great." Nearly 73 percent of them believe the reason is due to the powerful countries that do not want reunification. Also, about 72 percent of them believe "the reunification has not been possible because of North Korean militarism." The middle class sentiment on anti-communism is also strong. But two-thirds of the respondents felt negatively about the opinion that "a certain amount of the human rights violations are inevitable under the divided circumstances," while only one-third felt positively about it.

What's interesting is that the middle class definitely prefers democratization to reunification. About 68 percent agreed to the statement that "realization of democratization is necessary to improve the probability of reunification," while 31 percent disagreed. On the other hand, only 35 percent agreed to the statement that "reunification is necessary to realize a true democratization," while 64 percent disagreed.

When asked whether "it would be desirable to extend human rights even if it might hamper our economic growth somewhat," 86 percent of the respondents agreed. In addition, 83 percent responded positively to the statement, "it is desirable to slow down economic growth in order to achieve social stability and balance." And only 14 percent of the middle class felt that economic expansion must be accelerated even if it could mean certain restrictions on human rights, while only 17 percent said such an economic growth is desirable even at a limited expense of social stability and balance.

When it comes to the government's special treatment of the large conglomerates, about 70 percent said such privileges should be sharply reduced. Considering that a large number of the middle class are employed by large conglomerates, it is surprising that 70 percent of them don't approve the government's special treatments of large conglomerates. This can be interpreted as a direct reflection of the widespread understanding among the middle class that the government's economic development policy has become a hotbed of irregularities and corruption.

The middle class thinks the political leaders, power holders and the wealthy people are responsible for the overall discontent in our society. When asked to "point out two items that people are most discontented with," 54 percent of the respondents named irregularities and corruption among the leaders as one of the two items. Next, 22 percent of the people said the slow democratization process is the most important item with which they are discontent, while 12 percent said the slow democratization process is "the second most important item with which they are discontent. These two groups together represent 34 percent for this category. The corresponding numbers for the wealth differential are 22 percent and 14 percent each, giving a total of 36 percent. Aside from these three items, other reasons for the discontent were: the privilege concept (25 percent), student demonstration (19 percent), and confused judgment of values (16 percent). Unlike the sensitive reaction to the wealth differential, only 5 percent pointed out the absolute poverty as a problem--an interesting fact. To a large extent, this could be due to the fact that the middle class people do not consider the absolute poverty as a significant problem. It could also mean that today's middle class in Korea are passionate on the subject of equalitarianism.

Although the Korean middle class is very critical about political and social realities, they are relatively warm-hearted toward the significance of the 1988 Olympics, which is an international event. The question in this category was given separately in three areas--political development, economic development and promotion of society. Of these, the most favorable response was given to the promotion of society. With 31 percent of the respondents saying "the 1988 Olympics will contribute significantly to the promotion of our society" and 49 percent of the respondents saying "the 1988 Olympics will make some contributions to the promotion of our society," a total of 80 percent of the respondents feel positively about the impact of the 1988 Olympics on our society. However, the corresponding responses for the economic development were only 29 percent and 40 percent (a total of 69 percent), and the corresponding responses for the political development were only 19 percent and 36 percent (a total of 55 percent).

Burden of Educational Cost--When it comes to the standards of living, 26 percent of the respondents feel satisfied and 58 percent feel so so, indicating that 84 percent don't have much to complain of. Only about 10 percent of the respondents have no savings or investments, while the majority of them save or invest a certain amount of their monthly income. About 20 percent of the people save less than 10 percent of their income, 24 percent save 10-19 percent of income, 23 percent save 20-29 percent of income, and 22 percent save 30 percent or more of income.

Sixty-four percent of the respondents said their children's education expenses are burdensome. Also, 71 percent think the income tax rate is too high. Furthermore, 76 percent complain of too many contributions besides taxes. Of course, less tax and fewer contributions would be preferred, but people tend to show a strong resistance to erroneously calculated taxes although they would not complain much about the high tax rates. The same is true for the contributions. A tax-like contribution that is not of a voluntary nature but is of a semi-compulsory type is indeed a burden.

Now, the standards of living can be measured by the possession of modern conveniences. Among the items owned universally by the middle class households (at least 90 percent or more) are refrigerators, color TV's, telephones, gas ranges, and cameras. It is quite surprising that 42 percent of them now own automobiles. This rate is even higher than that for air conditioners--an interesting fact. The changes in the items possessed by the middle class households frankly reflect the economic growth in Korea. We know that such items as refrigerators, color TV's and telephones are no longer the items that appeal much to the middle class households. Items for the middle class households now include audio systems, credit cards, pianos, microwave ovens, video equipments, and automobiles. Golf club memberships and the like still belong to the upper class, but soon will become easily accessible to the middle class.

Anxiety over Health--Also included in this survey was examination of the items about which the middle class people are most anxious. The survey shows that 51 percent of the respondents are anxious more about their health than anything else. And 14 percent and 11 percent of the respondents respectively felt uneasy because of the political and social unrest. On the other hand, a relatively low percentage of the people were worried about economic or employment conditions. In terms of major reasons for the anxiety, 11 percent of the respondents counted economic anxiety, 7 percent mentioned living conditions after retirement, and 2 percent pointed to layoffs and unemployment. And only 3 percent mentioned possibilities of war as the major reason for their anxiety. From all this, we can easily learn that the middle class people are both extremely concerned and feel insecure about the inconsistent government policies, the political unrest that is due mainly to the delay in democratization, absence of the public peace, and the pollution and environmental destruction that are gradually becoming serious.

This survey shows that the Korean middle class is very critical about the present reality. When it comes to the relationships among the people's human rights, economic growth and social stability, an overwhelming majority said that the logic of economic growth can no longer be used to justify the suppression of human rights and social unrest and disorder, and that the economic growth can be put on hold if necessary.

Reasonably Comfortable Life--The respondents of this survey were selected based on an objective index, but we asked if they really felt they belonged to the middle class. Of course, the concept and extent of the middle class can vary widely with individuals, but we asked three questions to determine if the respondents felt they fit their own image of the middle class. The first question was whether they felt they belonged to the middle class.

Seventy-nine percent said yes. The second question was to which one of the five classes they thought they belonged. Only 2 people said they are very rich, 16 percent said they are reasonably rich, and 68 percent said they are average. Thus, when the last two groups were combined, 84 percent thought they maintained an average or the above average life style.

The third question was somewhat vague, but we asked the respondents to compare their living conditions to a model person of the middle class that we presented. The model person was the one who is not so rich but still can send children to college, is socially active, can take a family trip for summer vacation, and can enjoy a certain degree of civilized life. As a result, 69 percent said they are similar to the model and 3 percent said they are better off than the model person, indicating that 27 [as published] percent sufficiently fits this condition. Thus, it can be said that 72-84 percent feel they belong to the middle class, depending on the evaluation method.

Satisfactory Performance--Let's examine how the middle class people regard their own attributes. Since the internal structure of the middle class is highly diversified and is composed of heterogeneous occupations, it is impossible to evaluate them with a single unit of measure. But it is necessary to examine the middle class' consciousness of political and social trends.

A self-evaluation of the middle class shows that 85 percent of the respondents think they have made significant contributions to the growth of Korea. The middle class themselves are always critical of the press agencies and the existing systems (73 percent), but their critical minds do not always translate into actions (72 percent). Although they yearn for reformation of the existing systems, they oppose any radical methods (82 percent). Ultimately, the middle class wishes to assume the leadership role in a gradual reform toward democratization, and they actually try to project such an image.

The middle class has already been well established economically. They do not want any revolutionary methods to carry out the reformation of the existing systems. It seems that they want to pursue the reform within a given framework. That is why the middle class has been criticized for being opportunistic and individualistic. In particular, the people of the less fortunate class have criticized that the middle class has no interest in the actual conditions and demands of the less fortunate. However, the middle class themselves disagree about such a criticism. In addition, a large number of the middle class disagrees concerning the criticism that they tend to exhaust every means in order to attain their own profits and that they are overly consumptive. The middle class thinks their current status has been secured through individual efforts and accomplishments. The majority of the middle class think they are playing a sufficient role as a central power of the society. In addition, they think the middle class is not only economically stable but also is a moralistic class.

Results Analyzed

41070236 Seoul HANKUK ILBO in Korean 23 Jul 87 pp 5-6

[Assembled by reporters Pak Kyong-kun and Yi Yu-sik: "The Role of the Middle Class Today and Tomorrow"]

[Text] Professor Kwon Tae-hwan (Social Sciences Institute, Seoul National University)--The result of the survey of the middle class, which was conducted jointly by the HANKUK ILBO and the Social Sciences Institute of the Seoul National University, has revealed that the middle class is both progressive and critical toward reform. We have also learned that the middle class represents a new force, which sympathizes with other people's situation, while strongly resisting the elite leaders' irregularities, corruption and non-democratic attitudes that damage the people's freedom and equality. We have also observed such a process taking place during the period starting from the incident of 10 June through the declaration on 29 June.

It is extremely interesting to see how far the middle class, who will spiritually and physically be the center of our society from now on, will be able to go insofar as the immediate issues of democratization are concerned.

First of all, let's talk about the definition and current characteristics of the middle class based on our survey.

Professor Hong Du-sung (Social Sciences Institute, Seoul National University)--Definition of the middle class can vary widely, but this survey was limited to the size of the household. Almost 80 percent of the people feel they belong to the middle class, but a separate survey for the production workers has shown the rate to be about 20 percent. Hence, about 40-50 percent of the urban population seem to represent the middle class in Korea.

Professor Han Wan-sang (Social Sciences Institute, Seoul National University)--This survey shows that the middle class people in Korea are characterized by their aggressive and critical minds toward society--something that we have not observed in the past. They now demand changes and are sympathetic about laborers' struggle for survival rights.

In particular, considering that this survey was conducted before the disclosure of the Pak Chong-chol incident, wherein he was tortured to death, and in a situation where the freedom of speech was suppressed, and that only 3 percent of the respondents were in their twenties, we can imagine today's middle class is far more critical of the society than the survey shows.

Professor Kwon--The survey also shows that the middle class is more conscious of the politics than the politicians are. A large number of the middle class has also lost confidence in politicians.

Assemblyman Nam Jae-hui (Democratic Justice Party)--The high level of critical minds among the middle class people suggests a lot of things to politicians.

On the contrary, however, I think politicians are more conscious of the politics than the middle class is. It's just that many limitations in reality prevent politicians from carrying their high degree of consciousness into an action.

Assemblyman Kim Hyon-gyu (Reunification Democratic Party)--We saw that the citizens actually supported and cooperated with demonstrators in the Myondong incident. The government, too, could have been shocked by this. Without an opportunity to observe such incidents, the middle class' critical minds would have been considered a fabrication.

It has been revealed that the middle class is interested not only in the basic civil rights but also in the basic survival rights--something that they are not really subjected to.

In order to seize long-term political power, the ruling party attempted to eliminate the social disorder with physical force rather than through a rational political method. As a result, a lot of people had to sacrifice themselves. I think this is precisely why today's middle class demands changes.

Assemblyman Nam--It is possible that the middle class with a high degree of consciousness of politics could ask for changes and reformation, but it is true that such a consciousness has not been well reflected in the real political mechanism. We must keep in mind that the politicians, although they are highly conscious of their political duties, could fail to carry out their consciousness because of various problems including the political structure such as election and party system.

Assemblyman Kim--Of course, the politicians' political consciousness has not been studied so far. The problem is with the ruling party's method of ruling. The political consciousness among the people including the middle class is high, but the ruling party's method of ruling is still far from being modern. Don't you think that is why the people including the middle class are discontented with the ruling party and therefore are demanding changes?

Professor Kwon--In this survey, we asked about the roles played by major organizations or systems in our society. The answers were: "overly strong," "somewhat strong," "appropriate," "weak," and "very weak." The response by the middle class was: "the strong three, the weak two, and the very weak two." In other words, it was "the strong three and the weak four." The "strong three" were the president, the police and the administration. The "weak two" were the National Assembly and the judicial branch. The "very weak two" were the press and the labor unions. I think the major issues of the constitutional revision will include freedom of speech and activation of labor unions. During the transition period, what could be the resolutions for the "weak four," and what should be the middle class' role?

Assemblyman Nam--It seems that the term, "the strong three and the weak four," has recently become a popular phrase. It is not even necessary to use the survey result to say that our greatest pending issues now are democratization and democratic development. Through the democratization process, the role of

the National Assembly will increase, the judicial branch will gain independence, and the freedom of speech will be strengthened. The labor unions will also become activated, and some 5-6 million workers should become part of the system. The social justice and welfare problems, too, will have to be resolved systematically rather than through a lip service. Future issues of the constitutional revision will address these as major points of debate. Demands by the middle class will grow, too. In my personal opinion, I think the parliamentary government would be a better solution for "the strong three and the weak four." We need a parliamentary government to solve the problem of an overly powerful president and a big administration. At the same time, the parliamentary government enables the National Assembly to function well and enables the judicial branch to gain independence. However, the people overwhelmingly prefer the direct election system for the president. The government has now agreed to the direct election system and this has become a national consensus.

Professor Han--The significance of this survey is that it has clarified the underlying thoughts of the middle class and its role. But the government party appears less willing to repair the problems of "the strong three and the weak four" during the process of constitutional revision.

Assemblyman Nam--I would like to point out that the middle class' demand for a radical change or reform is meant to be a demand for a widespread availability of traditional freedom and equality that we have learned from the democracy rather than an indication that such a demand has come to a point of radical ideology.

Assemblyman Kim--The "strong three and the weak four" phenomenon is precisely an expected result of a dictatorial system. I think "the strong three" phenomenon was inevitable to strengthen the government power while "the weak four" were only an accessory used to disguise the government as a democratic one.

The authorities of the Republican party and the Democratic Justice Party thought the people would continuously support them as long as the growth-oriented economic policy provided the people with a materially rich environment. This is precisely why the people including the middle class think their political consciousness is higher than that of the politicians'. Rather than the high growth of the economy, the middle class seems to prefer resolutions of the wealth differential problem, stable growth of the society, and development of human rights. As we have learned from the active student circles and from the workers' movement, the political thoughts of the ruling party were apparently far outdated. The middle class will become the watchman of the government efforts in addressing the "weak four" problem.

Assemblyman Nam--Assemblyman Kim's criticism is bitter, but we deserve it. I think what the people want today can be classified into three categories: stability as well as security, economic growth, and democracy. The government party now deserves people's criticism insofar as it assumed that the people would sacrifice some of the democratic issues while the government is pursuing an economic growth within a stable environment. The Korean people now feel

that they should become like the people of the advanced countries even regarding this issue. I would like to interpret the DJP President No Tae-u's declaration on 29 June as an agreement for such a trend.

Professor Kwon--In this survey, we have studied the middle class' discontent and interests from various points of view. The survey shows that the middle class considers (1) democratization, (2) eliminating irregularities and corruption, and (3) resolution of the wealth differential problem as the most important tasks today. To carry out these tasks, the people demand fundamental changes, such as solutions for the systematic inconsistencies. What could be the solutions?

Professor Hong--As Assemblyman Nam mentioned earlier, everyone today wants stability. The problem is how we can actually achieve the stability. The North Korean threat no longer serves a valid logic to suppress social disturbances, while democratization or demand for democracy is being accepted as an essential step toward stability.

Since the middle class feels economically more secure than the production workers do, they have become more interested in political and social affairs. The people in the low-income class are most interested in solving the bread-and-butter problem, but the middle class, mostly satisfied in an economic sense, feel a greater need for democratization or democracy, and therefore, they think democracy is the necessary step toward stability.

Assemblyman Nam--I think our economic growth has been successful thus far. The remaining tasks leading to stability are democratization and resolution of the wealth differential. However, as we saw in the incident where the RDP President Kim Yong-sam's interview was interrupted, we have become indeed skeptical about the way the society turns. Should such a [disruptive] trend continue, another survey in the next few months could show that the middle class is far more concerned about the issues of stability and economic growth than that of democratization. The tasks of democratization and elimination of irregularities and corruption should be carried out after the establishment of stability and prosperity.

Assemblyman Kim--In fact, the National Assembly and the judicial branch have failed to live up to their purpose, and have become the subject of the people's criticism. And the people have looked at the labor unions as a government service thus far. It is also true that the press has not done its job well.

Under such circumstances, the people from all walks of life complain of their self-interests. As we can see, workers demand revival of the three labor rights including the group activity right, while students of the active circles demand overthrow of dictatorship and attainment of democracy.

But the situation before and after 10 June is quite different. Until before the incident of 10 June, it was believed that most citizens opposed the students' struggle for democracy, but since the Myongdong incident, the citizens have joined the students fighting for democracy--a surprising change in the middle class. Even the homeless people struggling for survival do not hesitate

to demand democratization. The demand for democratization has become a universal issue in both urban and rural communities and is the greatest task that the middle class people must carry out.

Professor Hong--The three items--democratization, scraping of irregularities and corruption, and resolution of the wealth differential--are intimately related to each other, but they are, after all, connected to one basic thought. It is the moral issue of the leadership class of our society. As can be seen in the Bomyang incident, the middle class does not consider the wealth accumulation process a rational or normal phenomenon. They apply the same logic to the worsening of the wealth differential problem. It is extremely urgent that the people of the leadership class, who form the center of the society, take the lead in establishing and following ethical and moral standards.

Professor Han--The people have thus far experienced in generalization of their critical and structural thoughts. In the past, the people blamed themselves for poverty and social problems, but now the middle class is becoming more critical of the social structure concerning crimes and other social ills.

The middle class is demonstrating that violence by the rich and strong is far worse than that of the general public. They are also far more sympathetic to what they believe is right. With a widespread belief that crime by a large conglomerate is several hundred times worse than that of the common people, political appeasement or deception no longer has a place in our society.

During the coming process of democratization, the press will enjoy more freedom in reporting, and the students' demands will proliferate. In addition, the two Kims are expected to compete against each other within the party. Our society will probably experience an extreme disturbance. In fact, the "democracy + freedom = disorder" formula has ruled our society for the past 40 years. But we suspect that any attempt to interpret the demand for freedom and democratization as a disorder indicates a motivation to employ strong measures. I think the incident that prevented RDP President Kim from interviewing families of the arrested people was a painful part of the transition process toward stability. The disorder resulting from the democratization process is like a temporary illness resulting from a preventive inoculation.

It is possible that all kinds of demands could pour out from people in all walks of life, including the middle class, in the future. But we must not repeat what happened in 1980. Such a disorder should be understood only as a temporary pain resulting from a preventive inoculation, and the politicians must not try to make an adverse use of the situation. The middle class is expected to do their best in monitoring and resisting such ill effects.

Professor Kwon--The survey shows that the middle class feels very satisfied with its economic achievement, but feel extremely deprived of its political rights. It is very important to relieve such a feeling of deprivation through an extended opportunity in which they can politically participate. It is surprising that 96 percent of the middle class demand that the constitution includes the people's right to resist, which is a means of extending such a political opportunity. Let's talk about the issues of extending the political opportunity for the people, including the people's right to resist.

Assemblyman Kim--In fact, despite the hard work, we feel completely despondent when we experience such incidents as the Pak Chong-chol incident and the Bom-yang incident. Hence, it is only natural to feel negatively about the violence of the strong. Compared with the systematic violence and irrationalities of the government and the plutocrats, which can shake up the national foundation, the violence of the weak is so trivial that we can even sympathize with some of it.

You pointed out that the people have been deprived of their political rights. Since the people have been shunned during the past presidential elections and their voting rights have been lost to the self-controlled National Assembly, they are now skeptical about the voting right itself. Moreover, the ruling power, which has maintained itself with physical force, has always resorted to a forceful makeshift measure rather than seeking fundamental solutions when confronted with the students' and citizens' resistance and the workers' struggle for survival rights. I think the people's consciousness of persecution that was formed during this process has consequently developed a public sentiment that the people must boldly resist any abuse of power. The majority of the people think the right to resist should be regarded as a perfectly natural right, like the right to breathe, but they think it still needs to be clearly stated in the positive law.

Assemblyman Nam--As I review the survey result, I feel reassured of our people's healthy spirit. Of course, the politicians should keep their ears wide open. But I don't feel so optimistic about the social stability as Professor Han does. It is not because I am an assemblyman of the government party. I think the social disorder is far more complicated than a temporary illness resulting from a preventive inoculation. If every part of our society demands its own share at the same time, as is happening now, do you think our society is strong enough to endure it all? Speaking of the wealth differential problem, the statistics of income distribution show that we are in the upper class of the world economy. As can be seen in our history, such as the Donghak Movement, the Korean people possess a strong passion for equality in particular. Therefore, resolution of the wealth differential problem requires a continual improvement of the labor-management relationship and policy development. Of course, in reality, we must recognize the existence of limitations. Since the limited national budget must be allocated for so many expenses, the selection problem naturally follows, and some people become inevitably dissatisfied. This would be the same no matter which party takes the leadership.

Let me come back to the issue of the right to resist. I personally oppose the idea of including such a right in the constitution. First of all, this idea theoretically originated from the ideology of a natural law which is beyond our constitution. Therefore, its declaration alone is meaningless, and a working mechanism is necessary to make it effective. But the task of developing such a mechanism is in fact impossible. In essence, the issue of the right to resist is beyond a constitutional issue and should be dealt with from the point of political ethics and responsibility.

Professor Han--This particular issue should, at first, deal with the question of why 96 percent of the people are demanding their rights to resist a

non-democratic government and power at this point in 1987. I think the bottom line is that the people would like to have at least a declarative statement in the constitution because their basic civil rights have continuously shrunk for more than 15 years from the era of the Revitalizing Reform up to now.

During the age of the Revitalizing Reform, the people used the term "Korean democracy" instead of free democracy, maybe because they voluntarily agreed to the oppressive structure. However, the Fifth Republic has been solemnly advocating the free democracy while imposing more restrictions on the press which is an essential element of the free democracy. This shows an even more inconsistent situation. In fact, a series of incidents, such as infringement of human rights, large-scale financial affairs, and the Kwangju incident, have strengthened the people's desire to resist. However, the government and the government party have underestimated it. As we can see in the incident of 17 May, the government always interprets the people's resistance as a disorder and then resorts to an emergency measure. We must now stop repeating the past methods. If a democratic method is used to control the disorder, there would be no problems. But we can see that the government has used the word "disorder" thus far in order to justify the non-democratic measure.

Professor Kwon--The people's political interest could be satisfied when their conscience is allowed to resist. For example, the people's refusal to pay the TV audience fee really means a demand for a better service rather than a plain opposition to the fee itself. Under such circumstances, the people could become vexed at the fee that is collected in a coercive manner in the name of a consolidated bill. I think the resistance rights should be studied on the basis of our experience and history rather than debating about it in philosophical and theoretical terms. Now, let's talk about the middle class people's view of our political parties.

Assemblyman Kim--As the survey shows, the middle class is very discontented with the political structure that is composed of conservative parties. Since this is due to the fact that the political circles have failed to satisfy the people's desire in all sorts of areas, the solution to this problem should be determined by the ruling party that currently holds the political leadership. We are in a situation where the people's expectation of the opposition party is rising rapidly during the process of democratization, and 40 percent of the people agree to the necessity of a reformative party. Since the main axis of the opposition circles, which currently serve as the headquarters of the people's movement, is the religious circles, it will take time for the axis to gain a political momentum. But in any case, we must pay attention to what the people are saying within our system.

Let me just say a few words on the recent talks about the uncomfortable relationship between the RDP and other opposition circles. Since the era of the Revitalizing Reform, the opposition circles altogether have been jointly fighting for democracy, and we are still doing it. However, as a political party within the limitations of our system, we are responsible for all consequences of what we do, and our objective is to seize the political power. Therefore, the [quality of] voice and evaluation can vary [over time], depending on circumstances.

Assemblyman Nam--The National Assembly and the political parties should provide the people with spiritual refreshments. As the advanced countries have demonstrated, expansion of labor organizations and improvement of their political consciousness naturally give birth to new political parties that speak for the labor demands. We must now start working on the foundation. First of all, our election system will have to be changed toward a direction that emphasizes the party election system or the proportional representation principle. From this ground, we will, sooner or later, move toward the parliamentary system.

Professor Han--The survey shows that "a vague opposition party is even worse than the ruling party." This means that there is no room for an intermediate type of organizations. Of course, such a meaning applies to both the government and the opposition parties.

Insofar as the democratization process advances smoothly, it would not matter whether the opposition circles make their entry into the systematic circles of the politics. However, if something goes wrong, a large number of the opposition circles could become a fierce watchdog of the underground force, and a violent showdown is even possible between these groups and the ruling circles. Thus, the ruling circles should at least try to listen to the voice of the people. During the coming negotiation of the constitutional revision between the government and the opposition parties, the government should sufficiently consider the opinions of the opposition circles including the labor class, thereby enabling the unnecessary tensions to dissolve.

Assemblyman Nam--I agree that we should listen to the voice of the opposition circles. However, to the extent that the opposition is focusing mainly on the partial programs such as wage and hour, it must be understood that the position of the government party, which must present a comprehensive program, is such that the macroscopic nature of the government party sometimes cannot consent to some of the well-intentioned programs. The visibility and the negotiation are separate issues.

Assemblyman Kim--The power struggle among the three Kims during the incident of 17 May was legitimate within a democratic party system; nevertheless, it failed.

Anyway, the two Kims should avoid even a friendly competition at this time in order to avoid such an evil spell. This is because only the unification of the candidates can satisfy the people's desire for the basic changes. What's more important is that despite the two Kims' political authority and their records of democratic struggle, a local war of the representatives can easily erupt. This time, the two Kims must work together toward unification, and the military circles, too, should stop thinking "a competition is a disorder" and should take the role of watchman.

Professor Han--I don't think local antagonism is entirely bad for politics. It's just that the ill-founded politics of the Pak administration [of the late President Pak Chong-hui] produced an erroneous philosophy of the politics of local sentiment. In terms of satisfying the people's desire, I don't think utilization of local sentiment by political parties would be harmful.

However, such a general principle should be considered an exception at this time, and I would like to see the two Kims cooperate with each other. Since DJP President No Tae-u has declared the government's will for democratization, which is an unprecedented event, recognizing the people's demand for democracy and their rights to resist, the ball is now in the hands of the opposition parties. Thus, the opposition's response, too, will have to be something that is comparable to "Mr. No's declaration." In view of this, I think unification of the two Kims would be the best response. Should one of the two Kims give up his desire to become a presidential candidate as if he is truly sacrificing himself for the democracy, not only the two Kims will be spotlighted but also the event itself will be recorded as the greatest affair in the political history of Korea.

Professor Kwon--One of the most popular terms nowadays is the "public will." This term has now become part of the daily vocabulary for politicians and the press that we sometimes feel ashamed of neglecting it. Just how much of this "public will" can be reflected by the middle class remains to be seen.

This survey confirmed that the middle class is neither a "conservative force seeking an immediate comfort" nor a "silent majority" but are "the force in search of changes and a historic turning point." Although the scope of the survey was limited, such a result could also be confirmed from a separate survey of the people's consciousness including the laborers'. The significance of today's discussion was to confirm the validity of such a result once more.

Considering that there were more agreements than differences between the members of the government and the opposition parties, I think both sides will find many common points even in the real world of politics.

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REGIONALISM IN YONGNAM, HONAM AREAS STUDIED

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[Article by Assistant Professor Cho Kyong-kun of the Pusan Industrial College: "A Study of Regionalism in the Yongnam and Honam areas"]

[Text] (Original Editor's Note: This is a summary of a thesis presented by Assistant Professor Cho Kyong-kun at a joint scientific conference held in Seoul on 27 July by the Korean Society of Political Science and the Society of Korean Political Scientists in the United States.)

Adverse Effects on Political Stability and Development

Conflict between regional communities in whatever country poses a serious obstruction to the political stability and development of that country. This is because regional conflicts, being emotional in nature, do not lend themselves easily to compromise, and make it difficult to reach agreement on political organization or procedure.

Unfortunately, this kind of regional conflict has long existed between the Yongnam [northwestern] and Honam [southwestern] regions of our country. The conflict between these two regions commonly known as "regionalism" has been a serious obstruction to political stability and development in our country.

Despite the seriousness of this regionalism, there has been virtually no full fledged efforts either in the academic or in the practical sphere to look into its causes and remove them.

Under these circumstances, the goals of this study are to analyze the regionalism existing between the Yongnam and Honam areas from the point of view of sociopolitical theory and, at the same time, to search for ways to resolve it.

To this end, this study, as its logical background, throws light at the substance and peculiarities of the regionalism existing between the Yongnam and Honam areas and various factors responsible for its formation and aggravation. At the same time, through opinion surveys conducted among college and university students in Kwangju and Taegu, it presents a comparative analysis of the various aspects of the basic mentalities and

dispositions related to this regionalism, the processes of spreading regionalism in society through major catalysts, the extent of experience in this practice, and the correlation between the extent of this experience and the basic mentalities and dispositions related to regionalism.

The regionalism of the Yongnam and Honam areas is one of the very serious factors which threaten political stability and development in our country. This is primarily because the regionalism is a major obstruction to our people's sense of national unity.

Regionalism may be defined as "a mind-set, developed out of one's regional relationships, that has the attribute of being negative and prejudicial to another area (or its people)."

Particularly, the regionalism of the Yongnam and Honam areas "is a mentality that makes each individual identify himself as a man belonging to the Yongnam or Honam area as the case may be, and as a consequence, has the attribute of being negative and prejudicial to the people in the other area."

However, it appears that the regionalistic sentiments of one area are different in substance from those of the other area. The two areas have one sentiment or attitude in common: "I do not like them" or "They are disagreeable." However, there is a difference between the two areas in the causes and dispositions which give rise to this common sentiment or attitude.

Honam's "Isolationism" Vs Yongnam's "Exclusivism"

First, the antagonism felt in the Honam area against the Yongnam area is based on the notion that traditionally, the Yongnam area has caused the Honam area to be excluded from participation in the major elite class and in the benefits from national policies.

Next, the regionalism of the people of the Honam area is not merely a feeling of repulsion against the Yongnam area but seems to consist of the "isolationist disposition" to shield their regional community from the national political system and from the entire political community.

On the contrary, the regionalistic sentiments felt by the people of the Yongnam area against the Honam area appears to be based on their opinion regarding the personalities and attitudes of the people in the Honam area rather than on any concrete damage done or on any practical motivation.

Needless to say, the regionalism of the Honam area is not completely dissociated from opinions regarding the personalities and attitudes of the people of the Yongnam area, but this factor is far more prominent in the case of the Yongnam area than that of the Honam area.

Moreover, the regionalism of the Yongnam area involves outward indifference to the unequal benefits between the two areas and a kind of self-pride--these two factors are a cause for concern for the future of the relationship between the Yongnam and Honam areas--and, in contrast to the isolationism of the Honam area, it has an "exclusionary sentiment" as its main component.

Nevertheless, despite this difference, the regionalism of the two areas has several characteristics in common.

The first common element is prejudice. The regionalism of both the Honam and Yongnam areas grows out of the fixed dispositions based on personality perception and judgment, as well as emotional fixation formed in the preadult age. In this case, the process of fixation in disposition is in large measure based on inaccurate and partial grounds rather than on accurate and valid grounds. For instance, according to responses to the questionnaire, hearsay about some regionalistic accusations of one region against the other region are generally accepted without ascertaining their truth.

The second element is negativism. The regionalism of one area precludes an affirmative opinion about the other region. This characteristic, which involves prejudice, makes one evaluate information or feeling that would otherwise cause a positive opinion, through the "filter of negativism," causing it to be reconstructed in a negative way. Typical reactions would be that "it is possible, but it is not their real intention," or that "there must be some ulterior motive behind it."

The third element is a group mentality. Generally speaking, regionalism stems from each individual's mentality. The regionalism of the Yongnam and Honam areas, however, exists as a collective consciousness. Needless to say, not all of the Yongnam or Honam people are given to regionalism, and individual differences in the degree of regional sentiments should also be recognized. Even so, a majority of people in the Yongnam and Honam areas feel regionalistic sentiments against each other.

It must also be noted that regionalistic sentiments of individuals strengthen collective regionalism, and collective regionalistic sentiments tend to turn more individuals into regionalism, and through this process, collective regionalism becomes evermore acute. It goes without saying that it is possible to reverse this process to ease regionalism. Nevertheless, the practice of regionalism in the sociopolitical sphere tends to strengthen the collective nature of regionalism.

The last element is the fixed directions which the regionalism takes. The regionalism of the Yongnam and Honam areas is directed against each other, with the regional community and its people in one area harboring antagonism against the regional community and its people in the other area. However, this regionalism is directed against a particular geographical center of each region. To be specific, the regionalism of the Honam area against the Yongnam area is mainly directed against Taegu, whereas the regionalism of the Yongnam area against the Honam area is mainly directed against Kwangju.

Presumably, this directional characteristic of regionalism stems from judgment as to where the responsibility lies for the inequality, as mentioned earlier, in the distribution of the benefits of national policies, and as to the people of which geographical center in each region typically represents its regionalistic sentiments against the people of the other region.

Cause of Conflict Between the Yongnam and Honam Areas

In fact, it is impossible to accurately determine what has caused the regional antagonism between the Yongnam and Honam areas and what is responsible for its aggravation. This is partly because this regionalism, based on the people's mentality, has grown more out of group influences than out of individual perceptions, and partly because apparently it had been affected by numerous events and developments over a long period of time, developments such as the historical division, the Japanese colonial rule, and inequality in participation in the elite class and in the benefits of economic development policies.

Of these factors, the bias in the distribution of elite posts and the benefits of economic development policies is regarded as a salient factor which has greatly influenced the formation of regionalism in the Honam area.

First, people in the Honam area feel that the Yongnam area has had a monopoly in the distribution of important elite posts and that the process of this distribution has not been above-board. This unfair practice has caused dissatisfaction and prejudice on the side that feels it has been a victim, and this in turn has resulted in the transmission and spread of regionalism.

In other words, the unequal distribution of elite posts is regarded as a factor responsible for the genesis of regionalism in the sociopolitical sphere, and can directly result in the pent up sense of disenchantment and prejudice, leading to the aggravation of regionalism.

The bias in the distribution of benefits from economic development policies and the resultant sense of economic alienation also have effects similar to those of the unequal distribution of elite posts. The economic development plans since 1962 are the case in point. People in the Honam area feel that the products and benefits of the modernization programs have been concentrated in the Yongnam area. The government's economic development policy must have been formulated and pursued from the point of view of practical considerations and needs, such as geopolitical location and the belief that a concentration of large-scale industries is better than the scattering of small-scale industries. Nevertheless, people in the Yongnam area feel that there have been some ulterior motives other than these.

An economic development has a direct bearing on the economic position of individuals and the community as a whole. Accordingly, there is much room for alleviating the feeling of dissatisfaction and prejudice resulting from the said bias.

The bias in state policy, even a seeming one, has had a considerable effect on the aggravation of the regionalism in the Honam area, in relation to the question of where most of the elite officials hail from.

The fifth element is the overemphasis placed by politicians on their regional relationships and their abuse of regionalism. In any era or in any country, the effects of "regionalism" cannot be completely ruled out. However, the so-

called local color played up, intentionally or unintentionally, by politicians themselves has a considerable effect.

Catalysts for Spreading Regionalism Throughout the Community

In our country, each politician or each political group can be a catalyst in spreading regionalism in society. When seen from this point of view, the local colors displayed by politicians from the Yongnam and Honam areas in elections and other political forums in the past have had a strong correlation with the aggravation of regionalism. What is more, some specific individuals and political groups have intentionally resorted to regionalism to further their political interests. Politicians themselves should have a self-introspection on this matter.

The presence of catalytic factors by itself does not automatically cause regionalism, but the furnishing of various information (irrespective of whether it is true, far-fetched, or distorted) will aggravate regionalism, and the transmission of such information to the younger generation will, in a sense, give rise to new regionalistic sentiments.

What is important in this connection is that the historical division, the Japanese colonial rule, the biased distribution of elite posts and the benefits from national policies, and the political abuse have a close relationship to developing regionalism into a sociopolitical phenomenon, irrespective of whether they are underlying, causative, or contributory factors.

As pointed out earlier in explaining each of these factors, they can be used as a ground for regionalism, and in some cases, they can be used to transmit and disseminate regionalism by exaggerating or distorting their substance.

In analyzing the regionalism of the Yongnam and Honam area, the author chose to make a theoretical approach to the process of developing regionalism into a sociopolitical practice, because the major vehicles of this development, among others, have played a leading role in transmitting and disseminating regionalism. Another reason is that whether the regionalism in the Yongnam and Honam area will be resolved or not depends in a large measure on what role these catalytic factors will play.

(Almond) and (Powell) cited 10 models of universal catalysts which stimulate the development of regionalism into a sociopolitical factors, ranging from the family to a specific political outcome. However, their researches into these catalysts limited the scope of their questionnaires to the family, school, and friends, plus the army in questions to males.

They limited their questionnaires to these catalysts because in their view, these catalysts have prominent effects on the development of regionalism into a sociopolitical phenomenon. Most of the proponents of the theory of regionalism as a sociopolitical phenomenon are in agreement that the preadult age is the most important period in which people acquire political knowledge. In our country, the family, school, and friends, are the potent catalysts in spreading regionalism into society.

In the case of males, the army, in which the soldiers are subjected to strict discipline exceeding the requirements of ordinary society, is also a strong catalyst of such process. Precisely because of these considerations, the scope of the questionnaire in this research was limited to four catalysts. Also taken into consideration in making this decision was the fact that the respondents were chosen from among college and university students was also taken into consideration in making this decision.

On the other hand, to analyze the scope of the roles played by these important catalysts in spreading regionalism in society, college and university students were asked in the questionnaire whether they have heard any regionalistic expressions through these catalysts, namely their families, schools, friends, and troops, and if so, when they heard them.

Hearing regionalistic remarks does not necessarily make people become conditioned to regionalism. The fact itself that regionalistic expressions are made within these catalytic agents, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will play a part in spreading regionalism in society.

Particularly, in the preadult age, people can form a full-fledged regionalistic prejudice or preoccupation merely by hearing such expressions. Therefore, the questions in this survey regarding regionalistic expressions are valid and meaningful.

This survey sought to make a comparative analysis of the following three subject matters: 1) various basic regionalistic perceptions and dispositions, 2) the process of spreading regionalism in society through the major catalysts, and 3) the correlation between the extent of experience in this process and the basic regionalistic perceptions and dispositions.

Survey Concentrated on Kwangju and Taegu

The survey for this purpose was conducted on 1,500 samples drawn from among college and universities students in Kwangju and Taegu. These two cities were chosen for sampling purposes because they have long been each other's targets of regionalism. College and university students were used as samples because they make it possible to study the process of spreading regionalism in society in its all aspects by allowing a study of the four major catalysts and the time factor.

In drawing samples, an approximate number of samples was allotted in advance by stages. First, a total of 1,500 samples were divided into two to allot 750 each to Kwangju and Taegu.

Chonnam, Choson, and Honam universities and the Korea College of Education were chosen in the survey in Kwangju, and 250 samples were allotted to each of the universities and 150 samples to the college. In the survey, samples were drawn from among the students of Kyongbuk, Yongnam, Kyemyong and Taegu universities, Hyosong Women's College, and Taegu Teachers Colleges, all located in the Taegu area. On the basis of the size and the length of history of the schools, and depending on whether they are coeducational or not,

samples were allotted as follows: 170 to Kyongbuk University, 170 each to Yongnam and Kyemyong Universities, 70 each to Taegu University, Hyosong Women's College and Taegu Teachers College. The number of samples was also distributed in such a way that the ratio between the male and female students was approximately 6 to 4 in the two cities. In addition, in conducting the survey, efforts were made to evenly distribute the number of samples among humanities and social and natural science majors in each city as much as possible. Incidentally, the number of samples allotted to art majors in each of the two cities was 50.

Efforts were also made to include in the survey a considerable number of male students who have completed the military service, with a view to securing samples who have experienced regionalism as a social practice while in the military service.

Under this method of sampling, the survey was conducted by means of a questionnaire. Upon completion of the survey, a total of 1,486 samples, consisting of 747 students in Kwangju and 739 students in Taegu, have been analyzed. The ratio between male and female students was 63.7 to 36.3 (470 male students vs 271 female students) in Kwangju, and 59.5 to 40.5 (440 male students vs 299 female students) in Taegu.

The distribution by majors shows that in Kwangju, humanities majors account for 38.7 percent with 289 students, social science majors for 22.2 percent with 166 students, natural science majors for 32.4 percent with 242 students, and art majors for 6.7 percent with 50, whereas in Taegu, humanities majors account for 36.7 percent with 271 students, social science majors for 27.2 percent with 201 students, natural science majors for 27.7 percent with 205 and art majors for 8.4 percent with 62 students.

The number of students who have completed their military service was 256 in Kwangju, accounting for 53.8 percent of the total 476 male students covered in the survey there. This compares with 152 in Taegu, accounting for 34.5 percent of the total 440 male participants in the survey there. In sampling students in Kwangju, only those who are natives of the Honam area were chosen, whereas in sampling students in Taegu, only those who are natives of the Yongnam area were chosen.

The survey was conducted for 2 days on 23 and 24 April 1987 in Kwangju and for 4 days in Taegu, on 30 April and on 1, 4, and 13 May. Researchers asked questions to the students, making maximum efforts in sampling and in asking questions to insure the validity and reliability of the survey.

The starting point in all researches into regionalism is the most basic premise that "regionalism exists in reality." In a survey of regionalism, which is based on individuals' mentality, how acutely each individual is conscious of regionalism is the yardstick which makes it possible to ascertain the presence of regionalism and to measure its intensity.

"It Is Not Difficult To Resolve the Regionalism"

Seen from this point of view, Table I is of great significance. In the Yongnam and Honam areas combined, 62.8 percent of the students think the regionalism is serious. This response, together with the fact that only 2 percent think regionalism is not serious at all, confirms the fact that there is a regionalism, posing a serious problem.

The respondents in the Honam area who acknowledged the gravity of the situation was 69.3 percent of the total students polled there, whereas the corresponding percentage in the Yongnam area accounted for 56.2 percent of the total students polled there. The higher percentage in the Honam area may be interpreted in two ways.

The first interpretation is that university students in the Honam area strongly feel the exclusion of their area from all kinds of benefits and have strong feelings about what happened in 1980 and thereafter and that the regionalism felt by the people of the Honam area against the Yongnam area is more acute than that felt by the people of Yongnam against the Honam area.

The other interpretation is that university students themselves in the Honam area feel a stronger regionalism than their counterpart in the Yongnam area because compared with the Yongnam area, there are more contributory factors which aggravate the regional sentiments in the Honam area against the Yongnam and these factors are much stronger in the Honam area than in the Yongnam area.

The percentage of the respondents in the Yongnam area who think that regionalism is serious was 56.2 percent, which is far from low.

In resolving the regionalism, priority should be given to the question of how the people of the Yongnam and Honam areas view the possibility of such resolution. This is because although the ways and efforts to resolve the regionalism are important, the more people there are who believe such resolution is possible, the greater the possibility of resolving the regionalism will be.

Seen from this point of view, it is fortunate that as Table 2 indicates, 66.6 percent of the total students in the Yongnam and Honam areas feel that it is not so difficult or not difficult at all to resolve the regionalism whereas only 3 percent of the students think that it is impossible to resolve the regionalism.

No concrete way of resolving the regionalism, nor any basis of judgment for determining the feasibility of such resolution was indicated in the questionnaire, yet the positive responses account for 66.6 percent. This is because these students believe that despite the presence of the regionalism, there are more factors on both sides which promote a sense of unity than the factors which prevent it. Presumably, in their responses, they were influenced by the strong feeling that the regionalism should necessarily be resolved.

In the comparison of the regionalism in the two areas, the positive responses account for 63 percent of the total respondents in the Honam area, compared

with 70.3 percent in the Yongnam area. Honam's lower percentage may be attributable to the same reasons which are cited above in explaining the difference in the intensity of the regionalism between the two areas.

Given the fact that as noted earlier, the respondents who regard the regionalism as serious account for 62.8 percent, it is quite natural that the respondents who think it difficult to resolve the regionalism account for 30.4 percent of the total respondents.

Private Sector Initiative With Government Assistance

On the question of opinions regarding the feasibility of resolving the regionalism, those favoring the private sector initiative account for the highest percentage with 39.4 percent, followed by 24 percent favoring the government initiative, 18.8 percent favoring the initiative of the press, and 17.9 percent favoring the initiative of educational institutions.

The government ranks second in the order of preference in the two areas combined because 39 percent of the students in the Honam area favor the government initiative, although the percentage in favor of the government initiative is very low in the Yongnam area.

To be more specific, in the Yongnam area, the number of students favoring the private sector initiative account for 46.9 percent, or nearly a majority, followed in the order of preference by 23.4 percent for educational institutions, 20.5 percent for press media, and only the remaining 9.21 percent for the government. On the contrary, the choice of the students in the Honam area shows the following order of preference: 39 percent for the government, 31.7 percent for the private sector, 17 percent for press media, and 12.3 percent for educational institutions.

This difference presumably stems from a difference in opinion between the majority of students in the two areas as to who are more efficient in resolving the regionalism.

Specifically, a majority of students in the Yongnam area believe that reliable organizations which are least likely to arouse skepticism and antagonism should be in charge of the task of resolving the regionalism, whereas a majority of students in the Honam area are of the opinion that if the regionalism is to be resolved at all, organizations capable of strongly pushing the task with practical powers are best fit for this purpose.

This interpretation is also substantiated by the fact that in the order of preference, educational institutions rank second in the Yongnam area whereas they rank last in the Honam area at 12.3 percent, in addition to the fact that the highest preference is given to the private sector in the Yongnam area and to the government in the Honam area.

Nevertheless, it may be inferred from the overall responses that it is most desirable to resolve the regionalism under the private sector initiative with the active, genuine assistance of the government and with the cooperation of all organizations concerned.

As noted earlier, one of the characteristics of the regionalism of the Yongnam and Honam areas is prejudice. The regionalism is based on inaccurate information as well as some valid grounds.

This is corroborated by Table III. Out of the total students who responded, as many as 74.5 percent accepted rumors related to regionalism without confirmation and 21.6 percent said they believe rumors to be true. On the contrary, only 5.5 percent said such rumors are totally unfounded.

Such ready acceptance of regionalistic hearsay is due to the prejudicial and negative attributes of the regionalism. Furthermore, it is necessary to draw attention to the high acceptance rate of regionalistic hearsay because its frequent acceptance will be used as an excuse for the social practice of regionalism, leading to its aggravation and further dissemination.

On the other hand, 81.3 percent of the respondents in the Honam area and 67.6 percent in the Yongnam area accept regionalistic hearsay, the difference in the degree of acceptance being 13.7 percentage points between these two areas. The percentage of those respondents in the Honam area who said they believe such rumors to be true is 28.8 percent, or approximately twice the percentage in the Yongnam area, which is 14.3 percent. This marked difference may be attributed to the same reasons that were mentioned earlier to explain the difference in the intensity of the regionalism between the two areas.

How Far They Feel Removed From Each Other

Resolving the regionalism means, in a nutshell, making the people of the Yongnam and Honam areas cease to dislike each other and accept each other without prejudice. If so, how do they feel about each other as individuals? When the types of their feelings about each other are put in three categories, negative, ordinary, and positive, as in Table 4, fortunately 54.7 percent of the total students said they have positive feelings against 18.8 percent who showed a negative mentality. This brightens the prospect for resolving the regionalism.

When a comparison is made between the two areas with regard to the negative mentality, 23.6 percent of the respondents in the Yongnam area indicated their negative feelings, whereas the percentage in the Honam area was 14.2 percent, the difference being 9.4 percent. On the contrary, in the comparison between the two areas in regard to the positive feelings, the percentage the Honam area is 63.9 percent, or 18.6 percent higher than 45.3 percent in the Yongnam area.

This difference in the feelings of the people of the two areas toward each other arises presumably because the regionalism felt by the people of the Yongnam area more strongly reflects their opinions concerning the personalities of the people of the Honam area than the regionalism of the Honam area reflects the opinions of its people about the personalities of the people of the Yongnam area.

In other words, college students in the Yongnam area have a stronger tendency to disapprove of the personalities and attitudes of the people of the Honam area than their counterparts in Honam area disapprove of the personalities and attitude of the Yongnam people. As a consequence, students in the Yongnam area feel a stronger regionalistic apathy toward the people of the Honam area.

In most cases, of all the catalysts in spreading regionalistic sentiments in society, the family plays the most sustained and powerful part in this process. Particularly, because the family relationship in our country is still more of a hierarchical and authoritative nature than it is based on equality and freedom, family members exercise a significance influence on the process in question.

Table 5 shows that regionalistic sentiments were enhanced in the homes of 70.2 percent of the total college students covered in the survey. From the parents, brothers, or someone else in the family, other family members learn various negative, prejudicial, and stereotypical information on the people of the other area. Because it was unlikely that these college students were influenced by regionalistic expressions made by younger ones in their family, the regionalism practiced by the adults seems to be very serious for these students.

As for the times when people begin to learn regionalistic practices in the family, the middle school days top the list with 37.6 percent, followed by 31.2 percent in the high school days, and 22.7 percent in the primary school age. Of the total college students who experienced regionalistic practices, 62.6 percent acquire such practices before they graduate from the middle school, and 93.8 percent acquire regionalistic practices by the time they graduate from the high school.

This shows that the family plays a very critical part as a catalyst in nurturing regionalistic sentiments as a social practice. In 62.6 percent, or more than half, of the homes, people acquire regionalistic sentiments in their elementary and middle school ages. Some people take on regionalistic sentiments in their high school days. This is because in our country, even most of high school students may be said to be in the socially infantile stage due to very limited opportunities to receive factual information or have practical experience.

Biased Distribution of Elite Posts and Benefits As an Angle of View

On the other hand, in a comparison between the two areas in terms of percentages of regionalistic expressions heard at home, 72.4 percent of the total respondents in the Yongnam area experienced such sentiments at home whereas the corresponding percentage in the Honam area is slightly lower at 68.1 percent. [See Table 5.] By the time they finish the middle school, 68 percent of the students in the Honam area heard expressions of regional sentiments as against 57.5 percent of the students in the Yongnam area. People in the Honam area hear regional sentiments earlier than people in the Yongnam area, presumably because many causes of complaint, such as unfairness

in the distribution of elite posts and benefits from economic policies, have strongly aggravated the pent up regionalistic sentiments, causing regionalistic expressions to be heard more frequently.

Needless to say, students do not become conditioned to regionalism through school curriculums. Therefore, the catalytic role played by the school is limited to the teachers and professors. This is not to say that students are deliberately conditioned to regionalism by the teachers, but to say that students could become conditioned to regionalism unintentionally by the teachers. Even in such cases, the assumption is that the teachers' influence, although unintentional, is immense.

Among the four groups surveyed, the teachers come at the bottom on a comparative scale as a catalytic agent which provides opportunities for the students to hear regionalistic expressions. However, the fact that 53.7 percent of the total students polled said they have heard such expressions from their teachers is a very serious matter in view of the influence the teachers exercise upon their students.

Moreover, this seriousness is corroborated by the fact that 92.1 percent of these students answered that they had heard their teachers make regionalistic remarks before they entered college.

As to the question of when they first heard regionalistic expressions at school, 51.5 percent of the students said they heard such expressions from their teachers when they were in high school, 33.7 percent in middle school, 7.9 percent at college, and 6.9 percent in primary school. There is no significant regional difference in this regard. However, 64 percent of the students in the Honam area have heard their teachers express regionalistic sentiments at school as against 43 percent of the students in the Yongnam area. The percentage in the Honam area is higher probably because the regionalism of the Honam area is based more on actual complaints than that of the Yongnam area is, resulting in more frequent expressions of regionalistic sentiments by teachers in the Honam area.

To the question of whether or not students have heard their friends express their regionalistic sentiments, 83.8 percent of all the students polled said yes, indicating that friends function as an important catalyst in spreading regionalism in society. The corresponding percentage in the Honam area is 88.4 percent, higher than 79.1 percent in the Yongnam area. In a comparison between the sexes, the percentage of the male students was 89.6 as against 74.3 percent of the female students.

In a comparison between the sexes in the two regions, the percentages of the college students who have heard regionalistic expressions from their friends are as follows: 93.4 percent among the male students in the Honam area, 85.6 percent among the male students in the Yongnam area, 79.6 percent among the female students in the Honam area, and 69.5 percent among the female students in the Yongnam area. This actual order is what reason would have predicted.

The fact that 83.8 percent of all the college students have heard regionalistic expressions from their friends at one time or another, and 74.3

percent of this group have heard such expressions through their friends while in high school or college, indicates that friends play a critical role in making regionalism into a social practice.

This means that in high school and college, when compared with other catalysts, friends play a relatively greater role in the process of spreading regionalism in society.

As to when the students heard expressions of regionalistic prejudice in places other than school, no significant differences are found between the two areas and between the two sexes.

Experience in regionalism in the army is limited to males serving in the military. This does not necessarily mean that the army plays a limited role in making regionalism into a social practice. One reason is that the army, unlike other catalysts, provides people from the Yongnam and Honam areas with an opportunity for direct contacts with each other.

Therefore, expressions of regionalistic sentiments, irrespective of whether they are justifiable or prejudicial, can further confirm one in his regionalistic sentiments and thus aggravate regionalism as a social practice. Another reason is that those who are in the military service or who have completed the military service spread their regionalistic sentiments which they believe they have confirmed, into the groups to which they belong, such as their families, schools, friends, and workplaces.

Acute Regionalistic Sentiments in the Army

Of the college students who have completed the military service, 86.5 percent said they heard regionalistic sentiments expressed in the army. This percentage is the highest among the four catalysts, indicating that the army is one of the most important catalysts through which people learn the regionalistic practice. In view of the aforementioned assumption that the army exercises a more powerful influence than other catalysts, the figure 86.5 percent takes on all the more critical significance.

To the question of specifically from whom they have heard regionalistic expressions, most of these college students replied that they had heard such expressions from members of the quartermasters' office. In addition, a considerable number of students mentioned in their answers assistant instructors at training centers, their immediate superiors, and officers.

The results of all this survey and their analysis show that all the four catalysts, including the family, plays an important catalytic role in developing regionalism into a social practice.

Generally speaking, the role of these catalysts is particularly critical in two respects. First, the same experience can be had through all of them. An expression of regionalistic sentiments heard through one catalysts can be heard through all the other catalysts also, thus intensifying the process of spreading regionalism in society.

Of the 1,497 samples in this survey, only 334 students have heard regionalistic expressions through one catalysts. Including 554 students who have heard regionalistic remarks through all the major catalysts mentioned above, 1,152 respondents, or 77.5 percent of the total students polled, said they have experienced such expressions through two or more catalysts.

Second, there is a correlation between the intensity of influence exercised by various catalysts and the susceptibility of different age groups. Up to the college age, the family exercises the greatest degree of influence, followed by the school and friends. According to this survey, 37.6 percent of all the college students heard regionalist expressions at home in their middle school days, and those students who experienced such expressions at home either in their elementary, middle, or high school days jointly account for 91.5 percent of the total students polled. As for the influence of the school, 51.5 percent of the respondents experienced regionalistic expressions in high school and those who experienced such expressions in either middle or high school jointly account for 85.2 percent of the total. As for the influence of friends, the high school tops with 47.9 percent, and the percentage of those who experienced regionalistic expressions either in middle or high school or in college is 95.3 percent.

In other words, the gaining of regionalistic experience through the family is concentrated in the period from the elementary through high school days; experience through the school is concentrated in the middle and high school ages; and experience through friends is concentrated in the period from the middle school to the college days. Thus each catalyst plays its most potent catalytic role in the period when its power of influence is greatest.

The Role of Catalysts Should Be Rectified

Next, the survey data were analyzed to see if there is any correlation between the frequency in access to regionalistic expressions and three basic perceptive propensities.

The first assumption was that those students who have heard expressions of regionalistic sentiments through all the four catalysts view regionalism as more serious than do those other students who have heard such expressions through not more than one catalyst. The survey showed that there is a meaningful correlation between the two variables in this hypothesis, namely the frequency of experience and the degree of seriousness with which the regionalism is viewed.

The correlation between the two variables has been determined as "somewhat strong," and appears to be of a psychological nature. In other words, those students who have heard regionalistic expressions through all of the four catalysts regard the regionalism as more serious than other groups. This bespeaks that all catalysts, such as the family, school, friends, and army, not only spread regionalism in society but even influence the intensity of individual feelings of those who regard the regionalism as serious.

The second assumption was that those students who have heard expressions of regionalistic sentiments through all the four catalysts have a more negative

view regarding the feasibility of resolving the regionalism than other students who have regionalistic remarks through not more than one catalyst. In other words, the former group takes a negative view of the feasibility of resolving the regionalism whereas the latter group tends to have a positive view of such feasibility.

The third assumption was that the group of students who have experienced regionalistic expressions through all the four catalysts accept regionalistic expressions more readily than the group of students who have experienced regionalistic expressions through not more than one catalyst. The first group readily accepts regionalist rumors whereas the second group has the tendency of not accepting such rumors so readily.

Piecing all these analyses together, it becomes apparent that the major catalysts--the family, school, friends, and army--exercise influence upon the intensity of each individual's perception regarding the seriousness of regionalism and the feasibility of its elimination and the degree of his readiness to accept regionalistic rumors. First of all, this truth confirms that these catalysts are one of the major factors involved in the presence of regionalistic sentiments and their aggravation.

These catalysts not only spread regionalism and pass it on to the next generation but also induce individuals to regard regionalism more serious, to take a negative view regarding the feasibility of its elimination, and to readily accept regionalistic hearsay, thereby, in reality, aggravating the regionalism.

The findings of this analysis stress that it is urgent to rectify the functions of these catalysts in order to revolve regionalistic sentiments.

Need for Exchanges Between Kwangju and Taegu

As shown by this analysis, the people of the Yongnam area feel repulsion toward the people of the Honam which has grown out of their perception of the personalities and attitudes of the people of the Honam area, whereas the sentiments of the people of the Honam area even have an isolationist tint which tends to make them try to keep themselves away from the people of the Yongnam area, in addition to a feeling of repulsion toward them. Yet the sentiments of the people of the two areas against each other have some common characteristics, such as prejudice, negativism, collective mentality, and geological-centeredness.

The major factors responsible for the formation and aggravation of the regionalism are the Japanese imperialists' colonial policy, the political abuse of regionalism, and the erroneous functions of the social catalysts, in addition to the historic division in the background. Particularly, the unfairness in the distribution of elite posts and benefits from national economic policies has been a major contributory factor in aggravating the regionalism of the Honam area in particular.

According to this survey of the opinions of college students in the Kwangju and Taegu areas, the prevailing view is that the regionalism is serious, and a

majority of students readily accept regionalistic rumors. This indicates that there is little possibility that the regionalism between the Yongnam and Honam areas will disappear of itself.

The major catalysts, namely the family, school, friends, and army, are playing a stronger catalytic role in spreading regionalism in society among people in their preadult age, an important learning period in life, with each catalyst allowing similar regionalistic experiences. This particular fact bespeaks that unless full-fledged countermeasures are taken, the regionalism will remain unabated.

According to the results of the analysis, 37.3 percent of all the students polled have experienced regionalistic expressions through all of the major catalysts, and social experience in regionalism through all these major catalysts has somewhat stronger correlation with the formation of a negative attitude. This indicates that there is an ample possibility that the regionalism will rather worsen.

However, at least, college students, the younger generation, tend to have a positive view of the feasibility of resolving the regionalism and think that they do not feel the people of the two areas are too far apart from each other, and this affords a bright prospect for the future efforts to resolve the regionalism.

This finding of the survey points to the urgent need to reorient the major sociopolitical catalysts so that they may play an affirmative role. To be sure, an important way of resolving the regionalism is to foster the sense of unity among the people by having them correctly understand our history (including the Japanese colonial policy which promoted the regionalism); to eliminate any room for complaint and a feeling of alienation by securing regional fairness in the distribution of elite posts and in the implementation of national policies; and to have politicians and political groups exercise self-restraint in order to avoid triggering regionalistic sentiments.

However, unless the functions of the major social catalysts are rectified, it would be difficult for these measures to produce practical results. This is because the social catalysts in the two areas which have a stereotype perception of the regionalism are reluctant to accept the true purport of these measures at their face value and even there is the possibility that they will misconstrue them. Accordingly, particular emphasis should be placed on searching for ways to rectify the functions of the social catalysts, along with measures to eliminate various causes of regionalistic sentiments in both areas.

To this end, it is necessary, first of all, to publicly acknowledge the presence of the regionalism in the Yongnam and Honam areas and to let people know how this regionalism is dealing a deadly blow to political development and to the overall development of our country. It is not at all desirable to cover up the presence of this regionalism or to persist in taking no policy by pretending as if it posed no serious problem despite its real gravity. Rather this would only make the matter worse.

The reorientation of the social catalysts' functions in a positive direction requires all-out efforts based on cooperation among all organizations and agencies concerned. The role in the efforts to resolve regionalism should be properly shared at all levels--the private sector, the government, the press, and schools--and the people of each area should be encouraged to participate voluntarily in this endeavor on their own initiative.

Judging from the findings of this survey mentioned earlier, the government's policy considerations and active efforts will be more effective in the Honam area whereas in the Yongnam area, efforts under the private-sector initiative will be more effective.

At the same time, exchanges between the Yongnam and Honam areas must be expanded. In view of the tendency of the regionalism to be directed against particular population centers or areas, priority should be given to promoting exchanges between Kwangju and Taegu and between South Cholla Province and North Kyongsang Province. There may be some short-term frictions, but exchange promotion measures carefully formulated from a long-term point of view, not just perfunctory measures, will certainly contribute to resolving the conflict between the two regions. [Tables 1 through 5 are attached below]

Table 1 How serious do you think the regionalistic sentiments are between the Yongnam and Honam Areas?
(in percentages; number of respondents in parentheses)
[M=Male, F=Female]

Responses	Yongnam			Honam			Total Respondents		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
	(438)	(300)	(738)	(477)	(270)	(747)	(915)	(570)	(1,485)
Very Serious	10.0 (44)	10.7 (32)	10.3 (76)	19.9 (96)	16.7 (45)	18.7 (140)	15.2 (139)	13.5 (77)	14.5 (216)
Serious	44.3 (194)	48.3 (145)	45.9 (339)	47.6 (227)	55.9 (151)	50.6 (378)	46.0 (421)	51.9 (296)	48.3 (717)
Not serious	43.0 (188)	38.7 (116)	41.2 (304)	30.4 (145)	27.0 (73)	29.2 (218)	36.4 (333)	33.2 (189)	35.2 (522)
Not at all serious	2.7 (12)	2.3 (7)	2.6 (19)	2.1 (10)	0.4 (1)	1.5 (11)	2.4 (22)	1.4 (8)	2.0 (30)

Table 2. What, in Your Opinion, Is the Feasibility of Resolving the Regionalism of the Yangnam and Honam Areas?
(in percentages; number of respondents in parentheses)
[M=Male, F=Female]

Responses	Yongnam			Honam			Total Respondents		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
	(435)	(299)	(734)	(472)	(270)	(742)	(907)	(569)	(1,476)
Totally impossible	0.9 (4)	0 (0)	0.5 (4)	8.3 (39)	0.4 (1)	5.4 (40)	4.7 (43)	0.2 (1)	3.0 (44)
Very difficult	29.0 (126)	29.4 (88)	29.2 (214)	34.3 (162)	27.0 (73)	31.7 (235)	31.8 (288)	28.3 (161)	30.4 (449)
Not too difficult	60.9 (265)	65.9 (197)	62.9 (462)	50.8 (240)	68.5 (185)	57.3 (425)	55.7 (505)	67.1 (382)	60.1 (887)
Not at all difficult	9.2 (40)	4.7 (14)	7.4 (54)	6.6 (31)	4.1 (11)	5.7 (42)	7.8 (71)	4.4 (25)	6.5 (96)

Table 3. What Do You Think of the Rumor that Company X in the Yongnam Area (or the Honam Area) Sells Cookie Brand 'A' Associated With the Yongnam area (or the Honam Area), But Does Not Sell Cookie Brand 'B' Associated With Honam Area (or the Yongnam Area)?
(in percentages; number of respondents in parentheses)
[M=Male, F=Female]

Responses	Yongnam			Honam			Total Respondents		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
	(440)	(299)	(739)	(476)	(271)	(747)	(916)	(570)	(1,486)
Believe it	15.2 (67)	13.0 (39)	14.3 (106)	29.0 (138)	28.4 (77)	28.8 (215)	22.4 (205)	20.4 (116)	21.6 (321)
Maybe true	54.1 (238)	52.2 (156)	53.3 (394)	50.8 (242)	55.4 (150)	52.5 (392)	52.4 (480)	53.7 (306)	52.9 (786)
Probably not true	21.6 (95)	27.8 (83)	24.1 (178)	17.9 (85)	12.5 (34)	15.9 (119)	19.7 (180)	20.5 (117)	20.0 (297)
Cannot believe it	9.1 (40)	7.0 (21)	8.3 (61)	2.3 (11)	3.7 (10)	2.8 (21)	5.6 (51)	5.4 (31)	5.5 (82)

Table 4. In Your Contacts With People from Yangnam (or Honam), Do You Find Anything Agreeable About Them?
(in percentages; number of respondents in parentheses)
[M=Male, F=Female, N=Negative, O=Ordinary, P=Positive]

Responses		Yangnam			Honam			Total Respondents			Type of Feeling
		M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	
		(431)	(295)	(726)	(466)	(266)	(732)	(897)	(561)	(1,458)	
Keep them away	8.8 (38)	5.8 (17)	7.6 (55)	8.4 (39)	1.5 (4)	5.9 (43)	8.6 (77)	3.7 (21)	6.7 (98)		N
No interest in them	17.4 (75)	13.9 (41)	16.0 (116)	8.8 (41)	7.5 (20)	8.3 (61)	12.9 (116)	10.9 (61)	12.1 (177)		N
Would work together	7.9 (34)	8.5 (25)	8.1 (59)	7.1 (33)	4.9 (13)	6.3 (46)	7.5 (67)	6.8 (38)	7.2 (105)		O
Could become neighbors	20.4 (88)	26.8 (79)	23.0 (167)	11.4 (53)	22.9 (61)	15.6 (114)	15.7 (141)	25.0 (140)	19.3 (281)		O
Could become close friends	30.4 (131)	30.8 (91)	30.6 (222)	48.1 (224)	46.6 (124)	47.5 (348)	39.6 (355)	38.3 (215)	39.1 (570)		P
Could marry	15.1 (65)	14.2 (42)	14.7 (107)	16.3 (76)	16.5 (44)	16.4 (120)	15.7 (141)	15.3 (86)	15.6 (237)		P

Table 5. Have you Ever Heard Any of Your Family Members Express
Regionalistic Sentiments?
(in percentages; number of respondents in parentheses)
[M=Male, F=Female]

Responses	Yongnam			Honam			Total Respondents		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
	(439)	(300)	(739)	(472)	(270)	(742)	(911)	(570)	(1,481)
Yes	68.3 (300)	78.3 (235)	72.4 (535)	68.2 (322)	67.8 (183)	68.1 (505)	68.3 (622)	73.3 (418)	70.2 (1,040)
No	31.7 (139)	21.7 (65)	27.6 (204)	31.8 (150)	32.2 (87)	31.9 (237)	31.7 (289)	26.7 (152)	29.8 (441)

Regionalistic statements cited in this questionnaire:

"People from Cholla (Or Kyongsang) provinces cannot be trusted."

"Do not become acquainted with people from Cholla (or Kyongsang) provinces."

"You should be careful of people from Cholla (or Kyongsang) provinces."

"No one from Cholla (or Kyongsang) provinces should have power."

"People of Cholla and Kyongsang provinces have a mutual dislike."

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END

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